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Chapter 0. Introducción
Las externalidades de red pueden convertirse en un recurso muy importante para
las empresas en la era tecnológica. El éxito o el fracaso de un producto pueden
depender claramente de este factor sin obviar otros elementos importantes para las
empresas y consumidores en este tipo de mercados, pero pueden ser determinantes
y marcar la diferencia. Las externalidades directas de red aparecen asociadas a una
base de usuarios de un producto o a las expectativas que los consumidores tengan
sobre el éxito o fracaso de un producto determinado frente a su rival. De este modo,
en este tipo de mercados, un producto con una calidad inferior y/o un precio superior
podría imponerse si los consumidores lo creen e incluyen en sus expectativas que lo
hará.
Podemos encontrar externalidades directas cuando la valoración de un producto
para un comprador potencial aumenta a medida que es mayor su base de usuarios.
Un ejemplo de estos efectos utilizado por muchos autores es el de Betamax frente a
VHS en 1976, que acabó con Betamax fuera del mercado, imponiéndose VHS como
el estándar a pesar de ser un producto tecnológicamente inferior. No hace falta ir
muy lejos en el tiempo para encontrar ejemplos de externalidades directas de red.
En nuestros días los mercados de redes sociales también están afectados por estos
efectos: un usuario potencial estará más dispuesto a unirse en red social que cuente
con un amplia base instalada.
Las externalidades indirectas, aparecen cuando la valoración de un producto para
un comprador potencial aumenta a medida que lo hace la oferta de productos com-
plementarios del producto principal. Este es el caso de los mercados de videojuegos,
donde las externalidades indirectas juegan un papel crucial, ya que no es concebible
una videoconsola sin juegos. Otro factor clave en los mercados tecnológicos es la
piratería. La piratería se deﬁne como la reproducción y distribución de copias de
obras protegidas por el derecho de autor, así como su transmisión al público o su
puesta a disposición en redes de comunicación en línea, sin la autorización de los
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propietarios legítimos, cuando dicha autorización resulte necesaria legalmente. La
piratería afecta a obras de distintos tipos, como la música, la literatura, el cine, los
programas informáticos, los videojuegos, los programas y las señales audiovisuales.
Ante la importancia de este tipo de mercados y su rápido crecimiento en las última
décadas, el objetivo de esta tesis es el estudio de la competencia entre plataformas.
Así, se analizará teóricamente el comportamiento de las empresas ante la presencia
tanto de externalidades directas de red, externalidades indirectas y piratería, para
poder comprender mejor el comportamiento estratégico y ver cuáles pueden ser sus
consecuencias tanto para los consumidores como para las empresas que desarrollan
complementos.
Como acaba de señalarse, a lo largo de toda esta tesis nos centramos en un
contexto de competencia entre dos empresas o dos plataformas, debido a que la
mayoría de mercados tecnológicos son oligopolios (por ejemplo el de sistemas op-
erativos para ordenadores, el de sistemas operativos para móviles, los mercados de
videoconsolas. . . ). Estos mercados suelen estar abastecidos por un pequeño número
de empresas de alto contenido tecnológico. Un factor diferencial en este tipo de mer-
cados respecto a mercados más tradicionales es la necesidad de tener una amplia
gama de complementos. Es decir, un consumidor no estará dispuesto a pagar por
una videoconsola si no dispone de juegos para utilizar en la plataforma, y esto ocurre
con la mayoría de productos en este tipo de mercados: las plataformas necesitan
a los desarrolladores de aplicaciones y los desarrolladores necesitan a las platafor-
mas. Cuanto mas amplía sea la red de una plataforma más posibilidades tiene de
apoderarse de todo el mercado.
Desde la aparición de los primeros servidores de correo electrónico o incluso desde
la aparición de las primeras máquinas de fax las externalidades de red han jugado
un papel determinante en estos mercados. Más recientemente con la aparición de los
llamados smartphones, tanto las externalidades de red como la estandarización de
productos y la piratería de contenidos tecnológicos han estado presentes más pronto
o más tarde en este tipo de mercados.
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La estructura de esta tesis doctoral nos permite comprender la evolución de los
mercados tecnológicos siguiendo en cada capítulo una etapa diferente de esta evolu-
ción. En un primer capítulo se ofrecerá una revisión de la literatura relevante y a
continuación, en tres capítulos, los distintos modelos que se proponen.
En el segundo capítulo analizamos como, en un principio, las plataformas eligen
el grado de compatibilidad de su producto con el producto rival. Este podía ser el
caso de los servidores de correo electrónico en sus inicios, donde era muy complicado
enviar correos entre servidores. A tal efecto, las externalidades directas juegan un
papel crucial si no existe compatibilidad. El objetivo es analizar los incentivos de las
plataformas a elegir ciertos grados de compatibilidad en presencia de externalidades
directas de red.
En el tercer capítulo aparecen los desarrolladores de complementos para cada
una de las plataformas. De este modo se puede entender a las plataformas como
los sistemas operativos para los ordenadores, o bien Windows o bien Mac OS X, y
los desarrolladores de complementos como cada una de las aplicaciones de software
que existen para cada sistema operativo. Estamos pues ante un escenario con dos
mercados que interactúan en las plataformas, es decir, un escenario de two-sided
markets. Se estudiará los incentivos de las plataformas a establecer un estándar en
el mercado.
El cuarto capítulo cuenta con los mismos actores que el anterior pero se introduce
una problemática bastante actual, la piratería. Los consumidores pueden adquirir
software ilegal para utilizar en una de las plataformas. Los consumidores de apli-
caciones de teléfonos móviles pueden comprarlas en las tiendas on line o pueden
obtener copias piratas gratuitas. Estas copias piratas funcionan bien en un teléfono
móvil iPhone o bien en uno Android, los cuales harían las veces de plataformas en
este ejemplo. Se quiere establecer quién gana con la piratería y si realmente las
empresas que desarrollan las aplicaciones están dispuestas a impedirla.
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Objetivos, estructura y contenido.
La tesis está estructurada en cuatro capítulos. Tras esta introducción general se
presenta la literatura relacionada con la presente tesis. En los tres capítulos sigu-
ientes se desarrollan tres modelos teóricos con externalidades de red y competencia
entre plataformas. A continuación resumimos los capítulos 2, 3 y 4, sus principales
resultados y posibles líneas de investigación futuras.
En el segundo capítulo Compatibility, vertical diﬀerentiation and network ef-
fects, se analiza cómo la presencia de externalidades directas de red afecta a de-
cisiones estratégicas de las empresas referentes a la compatibilidad e intensidad de
la competencia. Este es un marco interesante para observar la evolución de los
mercados con externalidades de red en sus inicios, ya que, al principio no existía
compatibilidad entre productos, dejando todo en manos de las expectativas de los
consumidores; si los consumidores esperan que un producto monopolice el mercado,
casi con toda seguridad acabará haciéndolo. Aunque las calidades son exógenas,
la elección del grado de compatibilidad endogenizará en cierto modo el grado de
diferenciación vertical ya que, como se verá, éste afecta a la disposición a pagar por
el producto.
Se plantea un modelo de diferenciación vertical donde cada plataforma ofrece un
producto de distinta calidad. El problema de decisión de las plataformas se modeliza
como un juego en dos etapas. En la primera etapa las plataformas eligen simultánea
y no cooperativamente el grado de compatibilidad de su producto con el producto de
la empresa rival y en la segunda etapa del juego compiten en precios. La decisión de
los consumidores se verá afectada por sus expectativas sobre el número de usuarios
de cada producto (externalidad directa de red), además de la intensidad de este
efecto. En un mercado tradicional la intensidad de la externalidad de red sería cero,
reduciendo el modelo a un modelo estandar de diferenciación vertical.
La presentación distingue tres casos dependiendo de las expectativas de los con-
sumidores. En primer lugar nos referimos al caso en que las expectativas de los
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consumidores son simétricas. La empresa con el bien de calidad alta elige un grado
de compatibilidad y un precio mayores que los que elige la empresa con el bien de
calidad baja. Un segundo análisis contempla que las expectativas de la empresa
de alta calidad sean relativamente grandes: entonces si la diferencia entre calidades
es mínima, la empresa de baja calidad escoge nula compatibilidad y, además, no
producirá en el mercado. Por otra parte, si la diferencia entre calidades aumenta;
elegirá cierto grado de compatibilidad, pudiendo llegar a ser superior al elegido por la
empresa rival. En tercer lugar se considera el caso donde la expectativa del tamaño
de red del bien de calidad alta es relativamente baja. Si la diferencia entre calidades
es mínima; la empresa de baja calidad se apodera de todo el mercado estableciendo
incluso un alto grado de compatibilidad. Esta situación podría llevarnos a posibles
pérdidas de eﬁciencia del tipo de las asociadas a una mala elección del estándar, ya
que se trata del producto de baja calidad. Si la diferencia entre calidades aumenta,
la empresa de alta calidad elegirá cierto grado de compatibilidad, pudiendo llegar
a ser superior al elegido por la empresa rival. Lo que puede concluirse es que el
factor determinante son las externalidades directas de red junto con las expectativas
de los consumidores. Ante productos relativamente homogéneos (mínima diferen-
cia entre calidades) la empresa cuyas expectativas sean mayores se apoderará de
todo el mercado; en cambio, ante productos heterogéneos (aumentos en la diferencia
de calidades) ambas empresas participan en el mercado. Podemos concluir que las
empresas con un elevado tamaño de red siempre preﬁeren incompatibilidad.
En el tercer capítulo, Standardization and Network Eﬀects , se extiende el mod-
elo analizado en el capítulo anterior. Se analiza el efecto de las externalidades
directas de red y se introducen las externalidades indirectas de red. Para ello se
plantea un modelo donde interactúan desarrolladores de aplicaciones, consumidores
y plataformas. Se analizan las decisiones estratégicas de las plataformas en cuanto
a intensidad de la competencia, innovación y estandarización de producto. En este
capítulo, el problema de decisión de las plataformas se modeliza como un juego seis
etapas. En la primera etapa las plataformas eligen simultánea y no cooperativa-
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mente si adoptan un estándard comun en el mercado o no, en la segunda etapa
del juego eligen el nivel de innovación tecnológico de sus productos y en la tercera
etapa competirán en precios. En la cuarta etapa las empresas que desarrollan los
complementos decidirán si participan en el mercado o no, en la quinta etapa eligen el
precio de sus complementos y ﬁnalmente los consumidores deciden a que plataforma
se suscriben y compran un complemento.
Así se propone un modelo donde las plataformas están diferenciadas horizontal-
mente a la Hotelling mientras que las empresas que desarrollan complementos están
diferenciadas a la Salop; al ﬁnal de cada extremo de la línea de Hotelling se encuen-
tra el círculo donde están localizadas las empresas que desarrollan complementos.
Los complementos están diseñados para ser utilizados en una única plataforma. Un
consumidor que se encuentra situado a lo largo de la línea de Hotelling, primero
decide qué plataforma adquirir; una vez ha decidido la plataforma se encontrará
identiﬁcado en un círculo de Salop donde estarán las empresas que desarrollan los
complementos y decidirá que complemento comprar. Por lo tanto, a la hora de
decidir qué plataforma adquirir, el consumidor tendrá en cuenta las externalidades
directas de red y, además, las externalidades indirectas de red, relacionadas con el
número de empresas de complementos asociadas con cada plataforma. De este modo
quedan introducidas las externalidades indirectas de red basándonos en que, cuanto
mayor sea el número de desarrolladores de complementos de una plataforma menos
costoso será para un consumidor adquirir dicho complemento (en términos de utili-
dad indirecta). Se tendrá en cuenta que los consumidores adquieren una plataforma
y un complemento de una empresa que los desarrolla.
En este capítulo van a distinguirse dos casos atendiendo de las expectativas de
los consumidores, bien sean éstas del tipo fulﬁlled expectations, bien se considere
que las expectativas están centradas en una sola plataforma (non-fulﬁlled expecta-
tions).
Cuando se consideran fulﬁlled expectations, la decisión de estandarizar el mer-
cado depende del grado de diferenciación en el mercado de complementos. Si el
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mercado de complementos está muy diferenciado, las plataformas no adoptan el es-
tándar. Por el contrario, si el mercado de complementos está poco diferenciado,
las plataformas adoptan el estándar. También se obtiene que la propensión para
estandarizar el mercado cuando el número de empresas de complementos de cada
plataforma es distinto aumenta cuando i) la intensidad de la externalidad directa de
red disminuye, ii) el número de empresas de complementos de la propia plataforma
disminuye, iii) el número de empresas de complementos de la plataforma rival au-
menta y, iv) el coste de transporte de las plataformas aumenta.
En la segunda parte del capítulo se considera que las expectativas se centran
todas en una sola plataforma. En este caso las externalidades de red constituyen un
factor clave en la decisión de los consumidores, pero no son el único factor que inﬂuye
en su decisión; la plataforma sin expectativas participa en el mercado gracias a su
bajo precio. En este caso se obtiene el mismo resultado que en el segundo capítulo:
la plataforma con un elevado tamaño de red nunca querrá establecer un estándar,
debido a que puede establecer un mayor precio y obtener un mayor beneﬁcio si no
lo hace.
Para ﬁnalizar el capitulo se analizan los efectos sobre el bienestar. Dependi-
endo del grado de diferenciación de los complementos el bienestar será mayor con
o sin estándar; los que salen perjudicados con la adopción de un estándar son los
consumidores. Para entender este resultado podemos aludir al efecto precio y al
efecto variedad: al establecer un estándar se pierde la competencia en precios de las
plataformas por imponer su producto o sistema, todos los consumidores se encuen-
tran en la misma red y se pierde una variedad de producto al adoptar un estándar.
En el cuarto capítulo, Platforms, Software and Piracy in a two-sided market 
se estudia uno de los problemas más frecuentes que afecta a los mercados con alto
contenido tecnológico y externalidades de red: la piratería. Al igual que en el capit-
ulo anterior, plataformas, complementos y consumidores están presentes en el mer-
cado. Las plataformas seguirán estando diferenciadas horizontalmente en la línea
de Hotelling. Sin embargo, se supone que los complementos están uniformemente
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distribuidos en la línea unitaria con respecto a su preferencia por las plataformas,
al igual que los consumidores. La piratería aparece en el mercado donde los con-
sumidores adquieren los complementos. Por lo tanto, los consumidores deciden si
compran el software original o si obtienen una copia gratuita, teniendo en cuenta que
la copia puede ser de menor calidad y que las empresas de software tienen la posibil-
idad de invertir en mecanismos antipiratería. En la primera etapa las plataformas
eligen simultánea y no cooperativamente el precio de sus productos y la licencia
para los desarrolladores de complementos, en la segunda etapa del juego los con-
sumidores decidirán a que plataforma se suscriben y ﬁnalmente si copian o compran
el complemento original.
El objetivo es analizar como la piratería afecta a las decisiones de las plataformas
referentes a la elección de los precios que se cargan a consumidores y a desarrol-
ladores. Se pretende identiﬁcar, en este contexto bastante realista, quién gana con
la piratería y si los desarrolladores de aplicaciones realmente están dispuestos a
prevenirla.
En la primera parte de este capítulo se distinguen cuatro tipos diferentes de
escenarios dependiendo de la aﬁliación de los consumidores y desarrolladores: i)
consumidores multi-homing (aﬁliados a ambas plataformas) y desarrolladores single-
homing, ii) ambos pueden aﬁliarse a una única plataforma (single-homing), iii) de-
sarrolladores multi-homing y consumidores single-homing y iv) cuando ambos están
aﬁliados a las dos plataformas (todo el mercado es multi-homing). Se analiza la
decisión estratégica de las plataformas en cuanto a precios para los consumidores y
licencias para los desarrolladores en cada uno de los escenarios.
En una segunda parte se supone que un regulador social interviene en el mercado
para solucionar el problema de la piratería, y se analizan los mismos escenarios que
en el caso anterior pero con regulación.
Exceptuando el caso donde los consumidores son multi-homing y los desarrol-
ladores single-homing, los desarrolladores de complementos obtienen una mayor
utilidad con piratería. Este resultado nos deja entrever que los desarrolladores de
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aplicaciones no necesariamente van a ser contrarios a la piratería. Por otro lado ve-
mos que, si un regulador social corrige el problema, los desarrolladores obtienen un
mayor nivel de utilidad. Si los desarrolladores de aplicaciones no pueden prevenir la
piratería completamente deberían invertir en mejorar su producto e intentar explotar
las posibles ventajas de la piratería en vez de invertir en mecanismos antipiratería.
15
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Chapter 1. Related Literature
The literature that studies competition between systems that merge goods or
complementary components is extensive and, among other topics, it has studied
questions referring to decisions of technology adoption and consumer choice. Part
of the literature, which is related to the present thesis, has been devoted to study
decisions about compatibility and network eﬀects.
The literature usually distinguishes between two types of network eﬀects: direct
network eﬀects that arise in horizontal networks and indirect network eﬀects that
arise in vertical networks.
The literature dealing with direct network externalities is quite large and rather
recent. Katz and Shapiro (1985) and Farrell and Saloner (1985) were the ﬁrst to
develop models of competition between systems, where each ﬁrm oﬀers only one
product or component that combined by consumers to form a system. There is a
network eﬀect since a consumer's utility increases with the number of other con-
sumers who consume the system. These papers draw attention to the feature of
excess of inertia: the natural tendency of the market is towards the survival of a
system or a technology. As for the decision about compatibility, Katz and Shapiro
(1985) found that companies with a good reputation or with a high enough net-
work size do not want compatibility. Note that when markets become standardized
consumers experience a reduction in their choice set (there is less variety). Besides,
there might be an additional ineﬃciency stemming from the possible imposition of
an inferior technology or a product of a lower quality.
Other papers focus on situations in which each company produces all the compo-
nents, such as Matutes and Regibeau (1988) and Economides (1989). Both articles
characterize equilibrium prices and proﬁts with and without compatibility. In this
context it must be observed that consumers prefer greater variety because they
can merge the components from diﬀerent companies and form a higher number of
systems (mix-and-match). In contrast to the aforementioned papers, this type of
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companies (that oﬀer all the components) prefer compatibility because it generates
higher prices and higher proﬁts. This is true without network externalities and the
private and social incentives would coincide if the variety eﬀect dominates the price
eﬀect.
The introduction of product diﬀerentiation in models of technological innovation
is more recent. Belleﬂamme (1998) develops a representative consumer model of
product diﬀerentiation (non-address approach); the companies choose between two
technologies with network externalities (marginal cost decreases with the number
of companies that adopt the same technology) and are Cournot competitors. He
concludes that it is more probable that the companies adopt the same technology
the more diﬀerentiated the products are.
This result is in contrast with that obtained in settings in which product dif-
ferentiation continues on a path approach (address approach). In this way, Baake
and Boom (2001) demonstrate that, when there is high degree of diﬀerentiation, the
companies will agree the provision of an adapter that links compatible technologies
and stresses the externality. In their model, product quality is endogenous and, in
equilibrium, it is always decided in favor of compatibility. Sarkar (2005) develops
a model of vertical diﬀerentiation, where quality can be high or low, and standard-
ization is the only form of reaching compatibility; this does not always happen in
equilibrium. On the other hand, the article by Sääskillathti (2006) features hori-
zontal diﬀerentiation and she studies R&D investment decisions with direct network
externalities. Her focus is on the interaction between R&D externalities and compat-
ibility, although the latter is not decided strategically. When R&D investments and
the network eﬀect are important, the price may be reduced, which increases compe-
tition intensity. Therefore, previous results in the literature are reverted, pointing
out that compatibility is anti-competitive.
Indirect network eﬀects can generate an element of vertical diﬀerentiation; there
are papers based on the same idea, yet using diﬀerent models. Thus, Church and
Gandal (1992) and Katz and Shapiro (1994) examine the incentives of platforms
18
at the time to standardize the market, there is competition in a hardware-software
environment, and the companies of complements develop complements that work
exclusively with one of the platforms. An indirect eﬀect arises for products where
hardware sales inﬂuence software sales and vice versa. In Economides (1994) net-
work externalities are then internalized and take the form of economies of scope.
In software production, economies of scale are often present, which can result in
ineﬃcient technology adoption if development costs for software are lower for one
hardware technology, Church and Gandal (1993). Clements (2004) develops a model
with horizontal diﬀerentiation with both direct and indirect externalities, but he
does not analyze the two eﬀects at the same time. This author ﬁrst assumes that
the indirect network externality does not exist, analyzing in this way the eﬀects of
direct externalities; he then assumes the opposite and he analyzes the propensity for
the market to standardize. Church, Gandal and Krause (2008) examine the eﬀects
of indirect network externalities in a horizontally diﬀerentiated market, where we
ﬁnd hardware, software and companies that produce other goods. They study the
choices of the complements companies. In the work of Casadesus and Ruiz (2009), a
model of horizontal diﬀerentiation in two-sided markets is raised in the presence of
direct network externalities. Compatibility is represented by the complement, that
is to say, the platforms will be compatible if the complements can work for both
platforms.
Other overviews and discussions of the network eﬀects literature can be found
in the survey paper by Economides (1996) and in the books by Shy (2001) and
Shapiro and Varian (1999). Economides (1996) has a strong focus on the theoretical
literature and, like the literature in general at that stage, focuses in particular on
standardization, compatibility and industry structure aspects. The books tend to
focus on the theoretical literature, Shy (2001) or on the managerial implications of
these ﬁndings, Shapiro and Varian (1999).
The discussion on market intermediaries is the main distinction between the lit-
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erature on two-sided markets and the literature on network eﬀects, and on indirect
network eﬀects in particular. In the two-sided markets literature (Armstrong, 2006;
Caillaud and Jullien, 2003; Rochet and Tirole, 2003, 2006), the price structure
depends on the indirect network externalities between user groups (two-sided net-
work externalities). The classic example is provided by credit card services. In the
last years, many research works have addressed diverse issues related to two-sided
markets, and have considered variants of assumptions about timing, price instru-
ments and externalities. In two-sided markets will ﬁnd the possibility of consumers
multi-homing and/or developers multi-homing, Choi (2010) analyzes the eﬀects of
tying on market competition in two-sided markets with multi-homing, he incorpo-
rates the possibility of multi-homing on both sides of the market. Belleﬂamme and
Peitz (2010b) study the seller investment incentives in a two-sided framework with
consumers multi-homing and with sellers multi-homing.
Software piracy inﬂuences the two-sided network externalities. In this thesis,
when piracy is considered, a contribution to previous research is made since we ana-
lyze conditions under which piracy may not be beneﬁcial to ﬁrms, which is contrast
with the received literature that basically looks at when piracy is beneﬁcial. In
previous papers it is shown that, in the presence of network externalities, developers
may beneﬁt from software piracy.
In a monopoly structure, Conner and Rumelt (1991) found that increased pro-
tection raised price and proﬁt and Takeyama (1994) that copying lead to greater
ﬁrm proﬁts and can produce a Pareto improvement in social welfare.
In oligopoly settings we found similar results as demonstrated in Shy and Thisse
(1999), a coordinated software industry should choose not to protect the software
when the network eﬀects are strong, and Peitz (2004). Our fourth chapter diﬀers
from these contributions by taking a speciﬁc two-sided market view, we focus on
platform behavior and we analyze four diﬀerent types of scenarios 1. Peitz and Wael-
1The ﬁrst case is where consumers use a multi-homing strategy and developers single-home. Then, we consider
that consumers and developers single-home. Then, the case of only developers multi-homing is analyzed and ﬁnally
we look into the case of both agents multi-homing.
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broeck (2006b) show us that consumers are willing to pay for the original although
they could consume the download for free because they can make more informed
with the illegal copy.
Finally, Rasch and Wenzel (2013) study the impact of software piracy in a single-
homing two sided-market. Developers beneﬁt from protection if the impact on the
developers' immediate legal sales is small and the impact on consumer surplus from
software consumption is large and platforms' proﬁts decreases if the impact on legal
sales is large, because they reduce the license fees.
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Chapter 2. Compatibility, vertical diﬀerentiation and network eﬀects
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter we study the role played by expectations, the strength of the
network externality and product diﬀerentiation in the strategic decisions of the
platforms regarding compatibility and price competition. Network externalities are
represented by consumers expectations about the network size of each platform.
Although their qualities are exogenous, the choice of the degree of compatibility
endogenizes vertical diﬀerentiation since it aﬀects the willingness to pay for the
product. In industries with network externalities, the degree of compatibility can
generate an element of vertical diﬀerentiation when consumers perceive incompatible
products with diﬀerent market shares that represent diﬀerent levels of quality.
An example of the issues that we will be addressed in this chapter is the internet
providers, speciﬁcally e-mail providers. In the beginning, America Online and Delphi
Compuserver used their own e-mail systems. It was very diﬃcult to send e-mails
between systems of diﬀerent companies. Consumers ended up using the systems with
more consumers taking into account the quality of the service, consumers valued the
quality / network externalities ratio.
Network externalities play a crucial role in consumers decision making, not to
mention that quality also exerts an inﬂuence on this decision. If the mail systems
were compatible, consumers would focus on their quality, because all consumers
would indeed belong to the same network.
However, a high quality product might fail to prevail ending up with a relatively
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small network if consumers have low expectations, despite it being the high quality
product. This happened to Digital with its microprocessor Alpha. The Alpha chip
provided a higher quality than its rival Intel, they were faster. Even so Digital only
sold 300000 chips while Intel sold 65 million. Digital applied compatibility with
Intel and tried to beneﬁt from the large network.
Another example is given by the word processors. Transfer ﬁles fromWordPerfect
to Word is a process where the errors are abundant. In these products there exists
partial compatibility. The Word network size is greater than WordPerfect and its
quality is superior. If Word made its product incompatible then WordPerfect would
disappear.
A network is composed by a group of consumers of the same good or a compatible
good. The network provides beneﬁts or positive externalities if the utility enjoyed
by each individual consumer is greater with more users. The modeling in a market
with direct network eﬀects requires the consideration that the willingness to pay for
the product depends on the number of users. Demand changes each time that price
changes and a diﬀerent price implies a diﬀerent number of users, and the willingness
to pay is a function of the number of users. Therefore, the consumers expectation
about the number of users (and other features like compatibility, quality, and so on)
are one of the distinctive features in markets with network eﬀects.
The coordination between platforms is another important element: the introduc-
tion of a new microprocessor will be useless unless software that works with it is
provided. Coordination gives value to consumers if they have the expectation that
this coordination will occur. Thus, the combination of hardware and software al-
lows us to obtain a system. The compatibility decision - no, partial or complete - is
related with the intensity of competition and aﬀect the variety of products available
for the consumer.
The decision problem is modeled as a two-stage game. In the ﬁrst stage platforms
simultaneously and non-cooperatively choose the degree of compatibility and in the
second stage platforms compete in prices. We obtain the following results. When the
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expectations about network size are symmetrical, the high quality platform always
chooses compatibility and ﬁxes a higher price. The result changes when consumers
have diﬀerent expectations about networks size: if the diﬀerence between qualities
is minimal, only the company whose expectations of network size are larger serves
the market. If the products are minimally vertically diﬀerentiated, quality becomes
irrelevant and externalities become decisive. When the diﬀerence between qualities
increases, perhaps the degree of compatibility chosen by the high quality platform
is not necessarily higher than the degree of compatibility chosen by the low quality
platform and vice versa.
2.2. The Model
We consider a market formed by two vertically diﬀerentiated platforms, A and
B. Each platform develops a good with quality sA and sB respectively; we assume
that sA > sB > 0.
Each platform produces a good with speciﬁc characteristics that can make it
compatible with the rival product or not. The platforms choose the degree of com-
patibility of their products. This degree is given by {tA, tB}, where tA, tB [0, 1].
Thus,
tA measures the degree of compatibility of product A with B, whereas
tB measures the degree of compatibility of product B with A.
There are two extreme cases;
{tA = 0, tB = 0}totally incompatible products and
{tA = 1, tB = 1}totally incompatible products.
If products are totally compatible {tA = 1, tB = 1}, them ﬁrms compete in the
market. Consumers get the full beneﬁts of the total network and platforms speciﬁc
network sizes become irrelevant in consumers´ decision making.
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If products are totally incompatible {tA = 0, tB = 0}, them ﬁrms compete for the
market and each platform network size is important for consumers decisions.
This modelling allows for the possibility of partial compatibility in the case where
one of the two ﬁrms chooses ti, i = A,B, equal to zero.
There is a continuum of heterogeneous consumers in their willingness to pay for
quality. It is assumed that consumers are uniformly distributed in θ [0, 1] with
density f(θ) = 1; market size equals one. Each consumer consumes only one unit
of one of the two products. All consumers have common expectations about the
number of consumers of each product, these expectations are given by:
ni (0, 1) where i {A,B} i 6= j and ni + nj = 1
The indirect utility of a consumer is given by
Uθ =

V + nAv + nBtAv + sAθ − pA if buys from platform A
V + nBv + nAtBv + sBθ − pB if buys from platform B
(2.1)
We assume that V , the reservation utility level, is large enough to ensure that all
consumers will participate in the market. The market is covered. The parameter nA
is the expected number of A consumers and the parameter nB the expected number
of B consumers, v corresponds with the strength of the direct network externality.
It is assumed v [0, 1], ﬁnally pA and pB are the platforms product prices. For
a consumer θ the willingness to pay increases if the quality is greater and if the
expectations about the network size increase.
We can observe that this speciﬁcation allows to distinguish the eﬀect of the exter-
nalities from the same network (intranet externalities) from the externalities from
the other network (internet externalities) with the variable ti, that reﬂects the de-
gree of compatibility chosen. It is logical to assume that with more consumers in the
network the users obtain more utility than in the competing network. Summarizing,
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consumers are heterogeneous in their valuation of the quality and are identical in
their expectations about the number of users in each network.
The analysis of competition between platforms is modeled as a three stage non-
cooperative game, where platforms behave as proﬁt maximizers. In the ﬁrst stage,
platforms simultaneously choose the levels of compatibility. In the second stage
the ﬁrms simultaneously choose the prices for consumers and in the third stage,
consumers decide which platform to join. The solution concept is Subgame Perfect
Nash Equilibrium, we solve the model by backward induction.
Equalling the two branches of the indirect utility function there is one consumer
located at θ who is just indiﬀerent between buying from ﬁrm A or B. This consumer
is given by
V + nAv + nBtAv + sAθ − pA = V + nBv + nAtBv + sBθ − pB (2.2)
θ =
pA − pB − nAv + nBv − nBtAv + nAtBv
sA − sB (2.3)
The market demands are given by:
QA = 1− θ = 1− pA − pB − nAv + nBv − nBtAv + nAtBv
sA − sB (2.4)
QB = θ =
pA − pB − nAv + nBv − nBtAv + nAtBv
sA − sB (2.5)
The choice of the degree of compatibility ti endogenizes vertical diﬀerentiation be-
tween platforms: given a diﬀerence in qualities, if ﬁrm A increases tA the indiﬀerent
consumer is moved to the left and QA will be greater.
The costs are quadratic with the compatibility level that they choose and linear
with output:
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C(ti) = γ
t2i
2
where ti {A,B} and it is assumed that γ > 4
9
v (2.6)
C(Qi) = cQi, where c ≥ 0, Qi {A,B} (2.7)
With the assumption C(ti) = γ
t2i
2
we reﬂect the existence of diminishing returns
to compatibility investment and γ > 4
9
v guarantees that the degrees of compatibility
chosen are between 0 and 1.
Now, the platforms proﬁt are given by:
piA = (pA − c)QA − γ t
2
A
2
(2.8)
piB = (pB − c)QB − γ t
2
B
2
(2.9)
In the next sections we solve the second and ﬁrst stage of the game. The platforms
decide the price charged to the consumers and the degrees of compatibility. The
equilibrium is characterized by (p∗A, p
∗
B, t
∗
A, t
∗
B).
2.3. Platforms Decision: The Price stage
In the second stage the ﬁrms simultaneously choose the proﬁt maximizing price
that is charged to consumers. The ﬁrst order conditions are given by:
∂piA
∂pA
= 1− pA − pB − nAv + nBv − nBtAv + nAtBv
sA − sB −
pA − c
sA − sB = 0 (2.10)
∂piB
∂pB
=
pA − pB − nAv + nBv − nBtAv + nAtBv
sA − sB −
pB − c
sA − sB = 0 (2.11)
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And the second order conditions are given by
∂2piA
∂p2A
=
∂2piB
∂p2B
= − 2
sA − sB < 0 (2.12)
which guarantee a maximum since sA > sB.
From (2.10) and (2.11) the best response functions are given by:
pA(pB) =
1
2
(c+ pB + sA − sB + v(nA(1− tB)− nB(1− tA))) (2.13)
pB(pA) =
1
2
(c+ pA + sA − sB + v(nB(1− tA)− nA(1− tB))) (2.14)
Where it is easy to establish that prices are strategic complements. The Nash
equilibrium pair of prices is the following:
p∗A =
1
3
(3c+ 2(sA − sB) + v(nA(1− tB)− nB(1− tA))) (2.15)
p∗B =
1
3
(3c+ sA − sB + v(nB(1− tA)− nA(1− tB))) (2.16)
We can write the diﬀerence between p∗A and p
∗
B and we obtain:
p∗A − p∗B =
1
3
(sA − sB + 2v(nA(1− tB)− nB(1− tA))) (2.17)
If the diﬀerence in qualities is greater than certain threshold the price of the ﬁrm
with the high quality product is greater than the price of the ﬁrm with the low
quality product. This limit enhances, once again, the importance of the interaction
between the expectations about network size and the degree of compatibility. Unlike
a standard model of vertical diﬀerentiation, the price of the high quality product is
not necessarily greater than the price of the low quality product.
From the equilibrium prices it is easy to obtain the following comparative static
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results;
LEMMA 1.
(1.1) If the products are not fully compatible, an increase in the expectations of
own network size will lead to an increase in own price.
∂p∗A
∂nA
=
1
3
v(1− tB) > 0 (2.18)
∂p∗B
∂nB
=
1
3
v(1− tA) > 0 (2.19)
Note that the willingness to pay for a product increases as more users purchase
that product. If there is an increase in the expectations about network size of one
of the two products, then every potential consumer is willing to pay more for that
product.
(1.2) If the products are not fully compatible, increases in the expectation of the
rival network causes a decrease in own price.
∂p∗A
∂nB
=
1
3
v(tA − 1) < 0 (2.20)
∂p∗B
∂nA
=
1
3
v(tB − 1) < 0 (2.21)
The smaller the network that one ﬁrm has, the more it has to reduce prices to
compensate the eﬀect of the externality and attract consumers.
LEMMA 2. Under full compatibility, expectations of network size of any ﬁrm
do not aﬀect the prices.
30
∂p∗A
∂nA
=
∂p∗B
∂nB
=
∂p∗A
∂nB
=
∂p∗B
∂nA
= 0 (2.22)
Further, we always have that p∗A > p
∗
B.
This case implies that consumers perceive one network, the diﬀerence between
platforms is determined by the quality levels. With complete compatibility in the
products, the network size is the sum of nA + nB = 1, network externalities are not
important when users decide on which product to purchase. If the expectation of
a particular network is practically zero, but the products are fully compatible, then
network externalities would be irrelevant.
The equilibrium prices change depending on the strength of the externality.
LEMMA 3. The strength of the network externality does not aﬀect prices if the
expectations diﬀer but the products are fully compatible and if the expectations are
the same and the products are either fully compatible or totally incompatible.
∂p∗A
∂v
=
1
3
(nA(1− tB)− nB(1− tA)) (2.23)
∂p∗B
∂v
=
1
3
(nB(1− tA)− nA(1− tB)) (2.24)
LEMMA 4. Changes in own degree of compatibility cause an increase in own
price and a decrease in that of the rival.
∂p∗A
∂tA
=
nBv
3
> 0,
∂p∗A
∂tB
= −nAv
3
< 0 (2.25)
∂p∗B
∂tA
= −nBv
3
< 0,
∂p∗B
∂tB
=
nAv
3
> 0 (2.26)
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If one ﬁrm increases the degree of compatibility of its product then it is indeed
increasing the willingness to pay for its product. Ceteris paribus, the ﬁrm can set a
higher price without losing customers. If instead the rival ﬁrm increases the degree
of compatibility then the externality between networks is higher forcing a decrease
in price for made the product more attractive. As companies decide strategically the
degrees of compatibility, it is clear that the ﬁnal eﬀect on the prices depends on the
expectations about the network size.
REMARK.We wish to add the following comment. The prices in these markets,
generally, will not be a determining factor, despite it a key one on users decisions.
For new products not subject to externalities a skimming strategy is usually recom-
mended, with high prices that are acceptable to consumers less price sensitive, and
allow rapid recovery of investment. However, in the presence of the network exter-
nalities, this strategy can be counterproductive because it slows the development of a
users base. Moreover, it is recommended a penetration pricing strategy (being able
to even get to give away the product) that maximizes the creation of value linked
with the installed base. In these markets, even a monopolist has strong incentives to
launch a low-priced product, even below cost in order to attract a suﬃciently large
number of users.
2.4. Platforms Decision: The Compatibility stage
In the ﬁrst stage, platforms will choose the degrees of compatibility that maximize
their proﬁts. Fort he sake of exposition we will employ 4 to denote the quality
diﬀerence sA−sB. Making use of (2.15)-(2.16) we can write the following expressions:
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piA =
(24+ v(nA(1− tB)− nB(1− tA)))2
94 − γ
t2A
2
(2.27)
piB =
(4+ v(nB(1− tA)− nA(1− tB)))2
94 − γ
t2B
2
(2.28)
The ﬁrst order conditions are:
∂piA
∂tA
=
2nBv(24+ v(nA(1− tB)− nB(1− tA)))
94 − γtA = 0 (2.29)
∂piB
∂tB
=
2nAv(4+ v(nB(1− tA)− nA(1− tB)))
94 − γtB = 0 (2.30)
and the second order conditions are the following:
∂2piA
∂t2A
=
2n2Bv
2
94 − γ < 0 (2.31)
∂2piB
∂t2B
=
2n2Av
2
94 − γ < 0 (2.32)
which impose a restriction, restriction as follows
sA > sB +
2v2
9γ
Max{n2A, n2B} (2.33)
The platform A quality must be greater than platform B quality plus an amount,
this amount correspond with 2v
2
9γ
Max{n2A, n2B}.
The best response functions are given by:
tA(tB) =
2nBv(24− (nB − nA(1− tB))v)
94γ − 2n2Bv2
(2.34)
tB(tA) =
2nAv(4− (nA − nB(1− tA))v)
94γ − 2n2Av2
(2.35)
The Nash equilibrium pair of degrees of compatibility is the following:
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t∗A =
6nBvγ(24+ v(nA − nB))− 4n2AnBv3
3γ(94γ − 2v2(n2A + n2B))
[0, 1] (2.36)
t∗B =
6nAvγ(4+ v(nB − nA))− 4n2BnAv3
3γ(94γ − 2v2(n2A + n2B))
[0, 1] (2.37)
We verify the nature of the strategic variables chosen by platforms because they
are vital for the analysis. Reaction curves for strategic complements have a positive
slope, while it is negative slope for strategic substitutes
∂2piA
∂tA∂tB
=
∂2piB
∂tB∂tA
= −2nAnBv
2
94 < 0 (2.38)
It follows that the degrees of compatibility are strategic substitutes, the reaction
functions are downward sloping.
Next, we deﬁne the following levels of expectations:
nA =
4v − 9γ +√(2v − 9γ)(4v − 9γ)
2v
and nB = 1−4v − 9γ +
√
(2v − 9γ)(4v − 9γ)
2v
(2.39)
These levels of expectations make the choice of t∗A and t
∗
B independent of any
value of product qualities. This means: when the levels of expectations are given
by (2.39), the diﬀerence between qualities,4 , disappears from the equations (2.36)
and (2.37). The choice of the level of compatibility is not aﬀected by the diﬀerence
between qualities when nA =
4v−9γ+
√
(2v−9γ)(4v−9γ)
2v
.
We can see the values of the consumers expectations about nA when strength of
the network externality takes its extreme values
limv→0
4v − 9γ +√(2v − 9γ)(4v − 9γ)
2v
=
1
2
and
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limv→1
4v − 9γ +√(2v − 9γ)(4v − 9γ)
2v
=
1
2
(4− 9γ +
√
81γ2 − 54γ + 8)
From now on we will use these levels of expectations to measure the size of the
consumers expectations, when nA >
4v−9γ+
√
(2v−9γ)(4v−9γ)
2v
the expectations of the
high quality platform are relatively large and when nA <
4v−9γ+
√
(2v−9γ)(4v−9γ)
2v
the
expectations of the high quality platform are relatively small.
Now, remember that the degrees of compatibility must be bounded between (0, 1).
The equilibrium pair t∗A and t
∗
B will belong to (0, 1) as long as the following conditions
are met:
Condition 1. When the expectations about network size of the high quality
product platform are relatively large: sA ≥ sB + 13γ (2n2Bv2 + 3vγ(nA − nB)).
The above condition is always satisﬁed for nA is greater than nB ; however,
for high levels for the strength of the externality, v, we can ﬁnd that nB > nA.
Furthermore, this condition is applied in the particular case of nA = nB = 1/2.
Condition 2. When the expectations about network size of the high quality
product platform are relatively small: sA ≥ sB + 16γ (2n2Av2 + 3vγ(nA − nB)).
In this case nB is always greater than nA.
If these conditions are satisﬁed, then the second order condition and the stability
condition will also be satisﬁed, the latter condition tells us that
2n2An
2
Bv
4
(9γ(sB − sA) + 2n2Av2)(9γ(sB − sA) + 2n2Bv2)
< 1 (2.40)
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2.5. Comparative statics
We will analyze how the choice of the degree of compatibility varies depending
on whether consumer expectations about network size and the diﬀerence between
qualities. Also we will study how equilibrium prices and demands are aﬀected.
We distinguish two diﬀerent cases, considering that consumers expect that net-
work sizes are the same or diﬀerent. Moreover, in the latter case, we have two
separate subcases depending whether the expectation about the high quality plat-
form is relatively large or small.
2.5.1. Case 1. nA = nB = 1/2.
If consumers have an expectation that network sizes are equal, then expressions
(2.15), (2.16), (2.36) and (2.37), become
t∗A =
v(124γ − v2)
6γ(94γ − v2)
t∗B =
v(64γ − v2)
6γ(94γ − v2)
p∗A = c+
1
6
(44+ 4v
2
94− v2 )
p∗B = c+
1
6
(24− 4v
2
94− v2 )
Q∗A =
1
6
(4 +
v2
94− v2 )
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Q∗B =
1
6
(2− v
2
94− v2 )
It is easy to see that the ordering of the degrees of compatibility, equilibrium
prices and demands is determined by vertical diﬀerentiation 4, since
t∗A − t∗B =
6v4γ
6γ(94γ − v2)
p∗A − p∗B =
1
3
4
Q∗A −Q∗B =
1
3
(1 +
v2
94γ − v2 )
Which are always positive because 4 > 0. Thus, the platform with a high quality
good chooses a high degree of compatibility and sets a higher price than the rival
platform.
With symmetric expectations p∗A is greater than p
∗
B, this produces a shift of the
indiﬀerent consumer to the right, however the high quality platform sets a level of
compatibility greater than the low quality platform and the indiﬀerent consumer
moves to the left. We conclude that the compatibility eﬀect is stronger than the
price eﬀect.
LEMMA 5. For the same level of expectations nA = nB = 1/2, the high quality
platform ﬁxes a higher price and a higher degree of compatibility and obtains a greater
demand.
If the diﬀerence between qualities is small is possible that the low quality product
decides to make it incompatible. That is to say, the numerator in t∗B vanishes
if the strength of the network externality, v, is strong or if gamma, is relatively
large. With low product diﬀerentiation competition between platforms will be more
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intense. This parameter combination leads to the low quality platform to set price
equal to marginal cost. The choice of a certain degree of compatibility by the high
quality platform promotes the externality within the network that even consumers
with a low willingness to pay can aﬀord to purchase the high quality platform. This
is a particular case of one way compatibility, only one of the two platforms serves
the market.
The above comparisons suggest the importance of the diﬀerence between qual-
ities. We study how change the degrees of compatibility, prices and demands in
terms of 4 if platforms have the same expectations about the network size.
∂t∗A
∂4 = −
v3
(2v2 − 94γ)2 < 0
∂t∗B
∂4 =
v3
(2v2 − 94γ)2 < 0
∂p∗A
∂4 =
2
3
− ( v
4
6(v2 − 94γ)2 ) > 0
∂p∗B
∂4 =
1
3
+ (
v4
6(v2 − 94γ)2 ) > 0
∂Q∗A
∂4 = −
3γv3
(2v2 − 94γ)2 < 0
∂Q∗B
∂4 =
3γv3
(2v2 − 94γ)2 > 0
The eﬀects of changes in the diﬀerence between qualities are enumerated in the
following lemma;
LEMMA 6. For the same level of expectations nA = nB = 1/2: An increase
in 4 = sAsB produce: i) a decrease in the compatibility of the ﬁrm A, t∗A, ii) an
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increase of the compatibility of the ﬁrm B, t∗B, iii) a decrease in the quantity sold by
ﬁrm A, iv) an increase in the quantity sold by ﬁrm B and v) increases in the prices
of both ﬁrms.
Recall that the degree of compatibility are strategic substitutes. Increases in the
diﬀerence between qualities move the functions of reaction outward. We can deduce
that the magnitude of the shift is more strong for the low quality platform. Only
thus we can be understood that the eﬀect on t∗A is negative and the eﬀect on t
∗
B
is positive. Platform prices will be higher by the direct eﬀect from the diﬀerence
between qualities1. Increases in the quality diﬀerential allows both platforms obtain
a positive market shares.
2.5.2. Case 2. nA 6= nB.
The discussion on pages 34 and 35 allows us to distinguish two subcases depending
on whether the expectations about network size of the high quality product are
relatively large or not.
2.5.2.1. When nA relatively large
The graph below illustrates a relatively large expectation compared with the strength
of the network externality when γ = 1/2. We can observe that the values of nA will
almost always be higher than nB, but for very high levels of it may not be so.
1In (2.15)-(2.16) we can seen that the diﬀerence between qualities enters directly and indirectly through t∗A and
t∗B . In fact, the price p
∗
A depends positively from t
∗
A − t∗B . As t∗A > t∗B , p∗A price increases. However, the price p∗B
depends negatively from t∗A − t∗B . The direct eﬀect dominates.
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Figure 2.1: nA relatively large.
Minimum diﬀerence between qualities: we know that the Condition 1 is the
condition that must be fulﬁlled for the degrees of compatibility to belong to (0, 1).
Let us deﬁne the following lower limit:
s∗ = sB +
1
3γ
(2n2Bv
2 + 3vγ(nA − nB)) (2.41)
to study, through limits, how the equilibrium degrees of compatibility respond
when the quality diﬀerence is minimal:
limsA→s∗t
∗
A =
2nBv
3γ
limsA→s∗t
∗
B = 0
The platform with a high quality product sets a degree of compatibility that
depends on the expectations of rival network size, the strength of the externality
and the compatibility cost. When the diﬀerence between qualities is minimal, the
bigger the expectations about the rival´s network size the greater the degree of
compatibility that the high quality platform will choose. This is its strategic response
to promote an increase in the willingness to pay for its product by means of the eﬀect
of the externality between networks (internet).
As consumer expectations are favorable to the high quality platform and the
diﬀerence between qualities is minimal, the low quality platform chooses incompat-
ibility and it does not produce in the market; all consumers go to platform A.
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Besides;
limsA→s∗p
∗
A = c+ nAv +
nBv(2nBv − 3γ)
3γ
limsA→s∗p
∗
B = c
limsA→s∗Q
∗
A = 1
limsA→s∗Q
∗
B = 0
This limiting case leads to the same qualitative conclusions that are reached
under symmetric expectations.
Increases in the diﬀerence between qualities: if the diﬀerence between qualities
is important, the degree of compatibility chosen by the high quality platform is not
necessarily greater than the degree chosen by the other platform. Speciﬁcally, we
have t∗B > t
∗
A when:
sA >
3γ(nAsB + n
2
Av − nB(2sB + nBv)− 2nAnBv2(nA − nB)
3γ(nA − 2nB) > s
∗ (2.42)
Furthermore, as shall be seen below, increases in the quality diﬀerence leads high
quality platform to reduce its degree of compatibility while the low quality platform
increases it. From the above discussion we can conclude:
LEMMA 7. If the expectations about the network size of the high quality plat-
form are suﬃciently high, the platform that oﬀers the low quality product chooses
incompatibility when the diﬀerence between qualities is minimal. However the plat-
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form that oﬀers the low quality product chooses some degree of compatibility when
the diﬀerence between qualities increases, it may even be superior to the rival´s.
2.5.2.2. When nA relatively small
Here we analyze the case where the expected network size of the high quality
product is relatively low. The graph below (when γ = 1/2) shows that nA will take
values below 50%. Speciﬁcally, the values of nA will be lower tan nB regardless of
the strength of the network externality, v.
Figure 2.2: nA relatively small.
Minimum diﬀerence between qualities: we know that the Condition 2 is the
condition that must be fulﬁlled for the degrees of compatibility to belong to (0, 1).
Let us deﬁne the following lower limit:
s∗∗ = sB +
1
6γ
(2n2Av
2 + 3vγ(nA − nB)) (2.43)
to study, through limits, how the equilibrium degrees of compatibility respond
when the quality diﬀerence is minimal:
limsA→s∗∗t
∗
A = 0
limsA→s∗∗t
∗
B =
2nAv
3γ
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In this case, as in the previous one, the platform with a low quality product
sets a degree of compatibility that depends on the expectations about the rival´s
network size, the strength of the network externality and the compatibility cost. If
the diﬀerence between qualities is minimal, the greater the expectations, the greater
the degree of compatibility that platform B will choose.
As consumer expectations are favorable to the low quality platform and the diﬀer-
ence between qualities is minimal, the high quality platform chooses incompatibility
and it will not produces in the market. Consumers, with nearly equal qualities, opt
for the platform whose expectations are larger, in this case the platform B.
Furthermore;
limsA→s∗∗p
∗
A = c
limsA→s∗∗p
∗
B = c+
v(2n2A + v − 3γ(nA − nB))
6γ
limsA→s∗∗Q
∗
A = 0
limsA→s∗∗Q
∗
B = 1
In this situation the low quality platforms serves all the market establishing a
positive high degree of compatibility. This situation, if sustained over time, can
lead to possible eﬃciency losses of the type associated with a poor choice of the
standard, because the product in the market is the low quality product. Even
though the quality diﬀerence is minimal. The expectations about network size of
platform B are greater than the rivals; if the diﬀerence between qualities is small
consumers, before two undiﬀerentiated products, choose the platform with higher
expectations. In fact, in markets subject to network externalities it is not surprising
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that a technology is overtaken by another technically inferior if the expectations
about network size are favorable. The key to such the ineﬃcient adoption is the
dependence on the initial conditions, small diﬀerences in the initial market shares
(by the expectations) can make a big diﬀerence in the evolution of the market. In
fact, platform B ends up monopolize it.
Increases in the diﬀerence between qualities: Is worth noting the complementary
case stage when nA is relatively large. Now, the degree of compatibility chosen by
the low quality platform is not necessarily greater than the chosen by the rival.
Speciﬁcally, t∗A > t
∗
B if:
sA >
3γ(nAsB + n
2
Av − nB(2sB + nBv)− 2nAnBv2(nA − nB)
3γ(nA − 2nB) > s
∗∗ (2.44)
Besides, increases in the quality diﬀerence leads low quality platform to reduce
its degree of compatibility while the high quality platform increases it.
LEMMA 8. If the expectations about the network size of the high quality plat-
form are suﬃciently small, then it chooses incompatibility when the diﬀerence be-
tween qualities is minimal. However the platform that oﬀers the high quality product
chooses some degree of compatibility when the diﬀerence between qualities increases.
However, when the diﬀerence between qualities increases it chooses some degree
of compatibility and may be greater than the rival.
It is deduced from the Lemma 7 and Lemma 8 that: if the diﬀerence between
qualities is minimal, only the platform with more expectations about network size
sold in the market, independently of whether it is high or low quality platform.
This emphasizes the importance of the network externalities in consumer deci-
sions in technological markets, if products are minimally vertically diﬀerentiated,
quality becomes irrelevant, the important thing is network externalities.
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With the minimum degree of vertical diﬀerentiation, the network externalities
become the platform with more expectations in a monopoly. Increases in the levels
of quality produce more competition.
It is not clear the ﬁnal eﬀect on welfare, because the market structure and the
fact that consumers value other features of the platforms.
In contrast, if the diﬀerence between qualities increases, the company that has a
higher expectations decreases their degree of compatibility, while the rival platform
increases it and both platforms serve the market.
As we can see, even if there are network externalities, the value of the diﬀerent
types of technologies by consumers and vertical product diﬀerentiation can make
that multiple networks coexist.
Consumers may prefer the intrinsic advantages of a product in spite of belonging
to a smaller network. This markets usually end up with the adoption of standard,
especially if the products are totally incompatible.
Network eﬀects generate a process of positive feedback that usually end up with a
monopoly: for example Economides (2000), in the presence of network externalities
and with incompatibility products, the natural situation is the existence of diﬀerent
market shares. This is one of the reason whereby the Microsoft Windows operating
system currently holds 95% market share.
When exist minimal vertical diﬀerentiation, the network externalities entails a
number of disadvantages, there is a reduction in the variety of products, even if
diﬀerent consumers have diﬀerent needs, the market are less likely to opt for only
one of the two products, this happen when the quality diﬀerential increases.
If the low quality platform ends up monopolizing the market, we have a loss of
eﬃciency by the choice of a poorer quality platform.
2.6. Conclusion
In this chapter, unlike the related literature on network externalities, it has been
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assumed that the consumer expectations about the network size is exogenous. These
expectations are a key factor in consumers decision, in the network models the tech-
nology available is valued attention to other features besides price. Our results sup-
port those obtained by Katz and Shapiro (1985), where ﬁrms with a large network
always prefer incompatibility and Sarkar (2005), who ﬁnds a mixed strategy equilib-
rium where ﬁrms are diﬀerentiated vertically and exist incompatibility. Speciﬁcally,
in our model, with minimal diﬀerentiation, only the platform with high expectations
serves the market establishing incompatibility and if the expectation is one and the
diﬀerence between qualities is minimal we are in a case with incompatible platforms.
By contrast, as found Baake and Boom (2001), ﬁrms may prefer compatibility but
prefer vertically diﬀerentiation. In our model, without minimal diﬀerence between
qualities and expectations are not focused in one of the two platforms, the platform
with a highest expectations reduces its degree of compatibility, while rival platform
increase it, but both platforms remain partial compatibility levels. Furthermore,
when increase the diﬀerence between qualities the total welfare is higher despite
the increases in prices. These price increases can be justiﬁed, for example, the
regulation in the telecommunications markets and especially in the interconnection
between the networks of operators, for example telephone and Internet operators.
Therefore, the regulation on interconnection networks is a very important factor to
encourage the growth of interconnected networks and prevent the development of
standards and parallel networks that generate productive ineﬃciencies. Although
the network externalities are hardly solvable through the competition, these issues
deserve to be analyzed. A modeling competition in the hardware and software con-
text and network eﬀects would require a dynamic model. Consumers decision on
what hardware purchase in initial periods makes them captives in subsequent peri-
ods because the key is the dependence on the initial conditions, small diﬀerences in
initial market shares make a big diﬀerence in the subsequent market developments.
This scenario allows us a better assessment of the strategic decisions of ﬁrms, be-
cause network externalities produce a positive feedback, which makes the rate of
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penetration and technology growth are diﬀerent from other markets. The approach
of a dynamic model would allow the study of the duration of each phase of the
feedback, telecommunications markets are markets subject to these eﬀects. These
products often have a long phase of settlement, followed by a rapid growth phase
where increasing the number of users, the greater the number of users who wish to
adopt the technology, and eventually the product becomes the standard. Although
this work has been approached from the perspective of static equilibrium, a dynamic
environment would provide more information on the behavior of agents. Another
possible extension would be to consider that consumers are also diﬀerentiated in
their willingness to pay for the network externality. The study of innovation sys-
tems in markets is also a promising ﬁeld of analysis. Another interesting line of
analysis would consider technological substitution processes of products subject to
network externalities, analyzing whether to oﬀer support in one way or oﬀer full
compatibility of the products.
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Chapter 3. Standardization and Network Eﬀects
3.1. Introduction
This chapter contributes to the study of two-sided market modeling competition
between platforms and developers (but our approach is diﬀerent from the normal
two sided market analysis). Strategic decisions are taken regarding standardization,
technological innovation and market competition in the presence of direct and in-
direct network eﬀects in consumption. The model considers that the products that
platforms and developers oﬀered are horizontally diﬀerentiated; the products oﬀer
by the platforms are of a diﬀerent quality, i.e. are vertically diﬀerentiated.
Relative to the received literature the analysis relates the decisions of platforms
to the developers market and analyzes simultaneously the two types of externalities
in the standardization problem. Our main ﬁnding is that the market propensity to
standardize depends on the developers' degree of diﬀerentiation costs. Speciﬁcally,
whenever the developers are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, the platforms will not adopt
the standard, whereas they will do so whenever diﬀerentiation is suﬃciently low.
In particular, platforms will not adopt the standard under the extreme case of
consumers only having expectations on a single platform in the market.
In the welfare analysis we obtain that the eﬀect of the standard is an increase in
the price paid by consumers to subscribe to an existing platform and a decrease in
the intensity of competition. As a result the price increase, consumers are worst,
but platforms increase its proﬁts and consumers losses, the ﬁnal eﬀect is an increase
in total welfare.
These results suggest that in markets with network externalities, the adoption
of a standard may result in a decrease of competition. Besides, consumer surplus
is always higher without the standard. These occur due to the eﬀects that follow
the adoption of the standard: the variety eﬀect and the price eﬀect. The variety
eﬀect appears when the platforms adopt the same system because we loss one variety
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and the price eﬀect appears because when the platforms adopt the standard they
maintain a monopoly power.
On the consumers side, network eﬀects (direct and indirect) play a crucial role
when deciding what platform to subscribe to, a decision also shape by the level
of technological innovation and prices. If consumers place low expectations about
the network share of the product with better technology, then the high quality
platform could end up with a relatively small network. Consequently, an improved
technological innovation does not always guarantee a higher market share.
The market of personal computers oﬀers good examples of several types of plat-
forms and several types of complements. Operating systems like Mac OS X and
Windows 7 compete to attract the highest number of consumers. In this com-
petition, direct externalities are present (although with decreasing inﬂuence) and
indirect (with a more relevant role). There is a large number of complements for
each platform, but some of them are compatible for both platforms and some other
ones only work with one of the two operating systems. The diﬀerent types of soft-
ware packages are complements for a best use of the platform. Some complements
can be used on both platforms: OpenOﬃce.org and Microsoft Oﬃce, others only
work with Windows (Microsoft Works or Easy Oﬃce ) or with Mac ( i Work or
Apple Works ).
A similar example is the Web browsers. Internet Explorer only works in Windows,
but others Web browsers are totally compatible with all the platforms. For example:
Mozilla Firefox, Google Chrome, Opera and Safari. These last four Web browsers
would be an obvious example of a market formed by platforms that do not establish
a standard and work with totally compatible complements.
We only consider incompatible complements to analyze the total eﬀects of the
indirect network externalities. These externalities provoke an increase in the will-
ingness to pay for consumers when they purchase one of the two systems, that is, a
consumer will be more disposed to purchase, for example, Windows 7, if he knows
that Windows has a wide range of complements. The consumer will evaluate the
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number of complements for each platform and how much they cost. If a platform
has a variety of complements but are very diﬃcult to obtain (for the price or for
the distance) the consumer could consider buying the rival platform. Therefore,
the indirect externalities are a key factor in the consumers' decision making. The
utility of the consumers using the same network increased when an additional user
was linked to it. All consumers belong to the same network, independently of the
platform, and then they only take notice of the price. It is clear, therefore, that
when platforms adopt a standard, then direct externalities will become irrelevant.
This happens at present in the markets of DVD players or blue ray as opposed to
what happened with platforms Betamax and VHS. A frequent problem that is ob-
served in these markets is the interoperability, this is, the capability of a product
or system, whose interfaces are totally known, of running in another product or ex-
isting system or future system, without access restriction or implementation. This
problem is diminishing with the appearance of free software.
Finally, the last example is the learning of a word processor. It is convenient
to choose one with high market share or one that is expected to be adopted by
the majority of consumers, because it will allow accomplishing ﬁle interchanges and
it will be easier to work with another authors' documents. The utility directly
increases with the number of other people also working with it. The adoption of
a standard and the existence of incompatible complements is investigated in this
work. With incompatible complements, each company of complements works with
one platform, producing exclusive complements for this platform. For instance,
consider video-games where each game only works on the platform for which it
has been designed. Besides this, we analyze a rational expectations model under
two types of expectations: when consumers hope that both platforms will serve
the market and expectations on a single platform,when consumers hope that one
platform will serve the market.
There exists a direct relationship between direct and indirect externalities. With
a big network it is more probable to have a large number of complements and with
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more developers it is more probable to have a large number of consumers. The
largest companies remain dominant and the smaller remain small. The modeling of
a market with direct and indirect network eﬀects requires the consideration that the
willingness to pay for platforms depends on the users' number and on the number of
developers for each platform. Therefore, the consumers' expectations with respect
number of users (and other characteristics such as the availability, quality) constitute
one of the distinctive aspects in the markets with network eﬀects.
Finally, compatibility between components allows user to exploit complementar-
ities and indeed beneﬁt from a larger network. We ﬁnd a large number of factors that
ﬁt in these markets that they aﬀect the ﬁnal consumer's decision making. There
exist key factors; the control of a consumers installed base, intellectual property
rights, capability to innovate, the advantage to be the ﬁrst in the market, capability
of manufacture, the fortress, the number of complements, the reputation and name
of the brand. We are going to solve the game in three stages; at stage one, plat-
forms decide whether to adopt the standard, at stage two they choose the size of
the technological innovation and in the third stage they compete in prices. Finally,
consumers subscribe to one of the platforms and purchase a complement.
Section 3.2 describes the assumptions of the model. In section 3.3 the model is
analyzed and section 3.4 oﬀers the welfare analysis. The last section concludes.
3.2. The Model
3.2.1. Players
We consider a model of competition between platforms with direct and indirect net-
work externalities. The game has three diﬀerent types of players: two platforms
which oﬀer horizontally diﬀerentiated products and an oligopolistic market of devel-
opers and a continuum of consumers.
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 Platforms. There are two platforms that are diﬀerentiated in two dimensions,
a horizontal and a vertical one. Regarding the former, platforms are horizon-
tally diﬀerentiated on the Hotelling line. This dimension can be related with
design. Furthermore, the platforms oﬀer products with a diﬀerent levels of
technological innovation, they are captured by parameters θA and θB, we as-
sume that θi[0, θ], i {A,B} i 6= j. The two platforms are denoted A and B,
they compete to attract consumers and developers. They set prices {pA, pB} to
consumers and license fees {lA, lB} to developers; the latter can be interpreted
as what developers have to pay to enter and compete in the market. We as-
sume that license fees {lA, lB} are positive. Platforms can adopt a standard
in the market. They choose an element of Z = {0, 1}, where Z = 0 means
not adopting the standard and Z = 1 means adopting it2. The adoption of a
common standard requires mutual agreement by platforms. If the standard is
adopted , Z = 1, consumers get the full beneﬁts of the total network and plat-
forms speciﬁc network sizes become irrelevant in consumers´ decision making.
There is a homogeneous products industry with just competition within the
market. In case the standard is not adopted, Z = 0, each platform network
size is important for consumers decisions. There is a diﬀerentiated products
industry where platforms compete for the market.
 Developers. They ﬁrst decide whether to enter the market. If so, they choose
which platform to work with and they set prices. We use ni to denote the num-
ber of developers that trade with platform i. Developers are located around a
unit circumference. Each developer supplies one complement that is suitable
only for one platform; complements are incompatible with each other. De-
velopers incur license fees {lA, lB} and marginal cost cc. The complements to
platforms A and B have prices {psA, psB} for consumers. Developers are Bertrand
competitors and in equilibrium we have nA platform A developers and nB plat-
2Some authors use the term standardization when the market is monopolized. In this model we have the
possibility of having a duopoly in a standardized market, with only one system. Other authors consider the market
standardized when one of the platforms obtained 95% of the market.
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form B developers. Developers competition is modeled a lá Salop (1979). The
assumptions allow the characterization of the market for each platform sepa-
rately.
 Consumers. Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit line with respect
to their preference for platforms and uniformly distributed around the unit
circumference with respect to their preference for developers. The location of a
consumer with respect to platforms is denoted by x,x [0, 1]. The total mass of
consumers is 1, and their demand is inelastic. The respective unit transport cost
associated with platforms and developers are denoted tp and tc, respectively.
These parameters measure the degree of diﬀerentiation. For given ni, let dni
be the distance to the nearest type i developer. So consumers enjoy larger
utility the higher the number of developers. Consumer choose one platform
and then they choose one complement. Consumers have expectations about
network size of each platform, which are given by yi(0, 1) ,where i {A,B} i 6=
j and yi + yj = 1.
Two types of expectations are considered: i) fulﬁlled expectations and ii) non-
fulﬁlled expectations under the extreme case of expectations just on a single plat-
form. Note that the model exhibits two dimensions of product diﬀerentiation. The
platforms are vertically diﬀerentiated because of the potentially diﬀerent technologi-
cal innovation levels θA and θB that are determined at the second stage of the game.
Horizontal product diﬀerentiation is captured by a transportation cost that is linear
in the distance between each consumer's most preferred point x and the location of
the platform he buys from. The degree of horizontal product diﬀerentiation in the
developers market is reﬂected by the parameter tc > 0 and in the consumers market
is reﬂected by tp > 0.
The ﬁnal objective is to study platform competition when the standard can be
adopted and face a market of incompatible complements. The market structure is
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displayed in ﬁgure 3.1 below.
Figure 3.1: Market structure.
As we can observe in ﬁgure 3.1, when platforms do not adopt the standard the
type A-users are only connected with other type A-users in platform A. Similarly for
type B-users in platform B. This relationship is represented with the bold arrows.
Alternatively, when the standard is adopted the type A-users are connected with the
type B-users and vice versa since they now belong to the same network (the dotted
arrows appear). Competing platforms are said to be standardized if the utility of a
platform A user is enhanced by an increase in the number of platform B users, and
vice versa.
In the developers market, given incompatibility, type A-complements are only
connected with platform A and type B-complements are only connected with plat-
form B. Regardless of platforms adoption of the standard, complements are assumed
to be incompatible throughout.
The timing of moves is as follows:
In the platforms market:
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1. At stage 1, platforms decide whether to adopt the standard {Z = 1} or not
{Z = 0}.
2. At stage 2, each platform i, i {A,B} can make an investment θi in technological
innovation at cost γ
2
θ2i , where γ > 0 is a constant3.
3. At stage 3, platforms set license fees li, i {A,B}and choose prices pi, i {A,B}.
In the developers market:
1. At stage 4, developers decide whether to enter or not.
2. At stage 5, developers pay license fee li, i {A,B}and choose prices psi , i {A,B}.
3. At stage 6, consumers subscribe to a platform and buy a complement.
The analysis of competition between platforms is modeled as a three stage non-
cooperative game. As already noted the developers market is characterized by com-
petition a lá Salop. The equilibrium is characterized by (ps∗A , p
s∗
B , Z
∗, θ∗A, θ
∗
B, l
∗
A, l
∗
Bp
∗
A, p
∗
B).
The solution concept is Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium, we solve the model
by backward induction.
3.2.2. Relationship Between Players
Recall that it is assumed that complements are incompatible, this means that
the same complement does not serve for both platforms, it is impossible to use a
complement in platform A and later in B. Each complement is speciﬁcally designed
for use on a single platform.
We have developers of complements of type A,nA, and developers of complements
of type B, nB. Developers are distributed around two diﬀerent unit circles. Both
circumferences are independent and are not correlated. Thus, the distance from one
developer to another is 1
ni
.
3This assumption is common in R&D literature to reﬂect the existence of diminishing returns to R&D investments
(see, among many others, d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988; Kamien et al., 1992; Suzumura, 1992).
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The three diﬀerent players are illustrated in ﬁgure 3.2:
Figure 3.2: Consumers, developers and platforms.
The consumers are located on one of the horizontal lines. We assume that plat-
form A is located on the left end, at zero, and platform B is located on the right end,
at one. We assume that the length of the segments is 1. Depending on the location
of the segment, consumers are located at a point in the developer circumference.
Once consumer i takes the decision on which platform to choose, he meets the
circumference where the developers are present.
For a consumer who buys from platform A, when he reaches the developers market
he is located at distance dnA from the nearest type A developer and a consumer
who buys from platform B when he reaches the developers market he is located at
distance dnB from the nearest type B developer. It happens that dnA ≤ 12nA and
dnB ≤ 12nB ; the distance that a consumer has to travel to the nearest developer is
less than or equal to the distance travelled by the indiﬀerent consumer. It is assumed
that ∂dnA
∂nA
< 0 and ∂dnB
∂nB
< 0; an increase in the number of developers produces a
reduction in the distance travelled.
First of all we analyze the developers market; incompatible complements produce
an eﬀect on the purchasing decisions of consumers.
The proﬁt of type A developers and type B developers are given by
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picA =
(
xˆ
nA
)
(psA − cc)− lA (3.1)
picB =
(
1− xˆ
nB
)
(psB − cc)− lB (3.2)
The beneﬁts of the developers are given by the number of consumers who pur-
chased a platform A or platform B, divided by the number of type A or B developers,
where x̂ is the indiﬀerent consumer. Changes in variables of the developers market
will aﬀect the platform market.
We consider {lA, lB} as the portion of proﬁts that developers pay to platforms
in the form of license fees to design complements. For example, in the video games
market the companies that develop video games have to pay a license fees to make
games for the platforms.
The developers market is a free entry market, the proﬁts of both types of devel-
opers will be zero.
Developing the model, we obtain the prices that the developers charge consumers 4
psA = c
c +
tc
nA
(3.3)
psB = c
c +
tc
nB
(3.4)
As more developers enter the market, consumers have to pay a lower price to
purchase one complement5.
4As in Salop´s (1979) circular city model who obtains the same price but each type of developers market behaves
as an independent model, because we have two circumferences.
5We are assuming that, if a single software ﬁrm breaks oﬀ and forms a smaller network, it follows the same
pricing pattern that multiple ﬁrms follow, we always have: pci = c
c + t
c
ni
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By the zero proﬁts condition we obtain the license fees. Setting (3.1) and (3.2)
equal to zero and clearing for lA and lB yields
lA =
tcxˆ
n2A
(3.5)
lB =
tc(1− xˆ)
n2B
(3.6)
The developers proﬁts (which are zero by the free entry condition) and license
fees depend on the number of consumers that buy from each of the platforms. It
is assumed that the platform charging the lowest li, i {A,B} where i 6= j attracts
more developers, that is, developers prefer the platform whose license fees are lower.
We now move to analyze the strategic decisions of platforms. Rather naturally,
these depend on whether consumers expect that the market for platforms be a
monopoly or a duopoly.
Therefore, we analyze two types of equilibrium: the ﬁrst one, when consumers
expect that the market is a duopoly, and the second one, when consumers expect
that the market is a monopoly:
Fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium: consumer expectations are distributed between both
platforms: yA = x̂, yB = (1− x̂).
Non-fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium: consumer expectations focused only on platform
A: yA = 1, yB = 0 or focused only on platform B: yA = 0, yB = 1. In section 3.3.2
we consider that consumers expectations focus on platform A.
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A consumer located at x who buys platform A and a type A complement obtains
a utility of
R− psA − tcdnA − tpx− pA + θA + vyA + vyBZ (3.7)
and a consumer located at x who buys platform B and a type B complement obtains
a utility of
R− psB − tcdnB − tp(1− x)− pB + θB + vyB + vyBAZ (3.8)
Substituting (3.3) and (3.4) in the utility functions
R− cc − t
c
nA
− tcdnA − tpx− pA + θA + vyA + vyBZ (3.9)
R− cc − t
c
nB
− tcdnB − tp(1− x)− pB + θB + vyB + vyAZ (3.10)
We consider that consumers obtain a reservation utility level, R, which is large
enough to ensure that all consumers will participate in the market. The market is
covered. The consumers obtain extra utility if the number of developers that work
with the same platform that the consumers will buy is high, this eﬀect is reﬂected
by the parameters dni that measures the distance to the nearest type i developer,
i, i {A,B} and by the variable psi , the complement type i price, i {A,B}.
When we consider fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium the indirect utility function is the
same that we can observe above and when we consider non-fulﬁlled Nash equilib-
rium yB disappears because consumers expectations are focused on platform A and
platform B network size is zero. We introduce the direct network eﬀects with the
values of yA, yB and v, and we introduce the indirect network eﬀects with the values
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of dnA, dnB and tc. An increase in the number of developers produces a distance
reduction and consequently an increment in consumer utility.
Many products have little or no value in isolation, but generate value when com-
bined with its complement. In this utility function we observe that even if no
interaction is possible (if direct or indirect network eﬀects disappear), consumers
can still derive value from quality or from product features6.
3.3. Platforms Decision
3.3.1. Fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium
We know from the developers market that psA = c
c + t
c
nA
and psB = c
c + t
c
nB
; the
respective distance to the nearest type i developer i, i {A,B} is given by dnA and
dnB and we are assuming fulﬁlled expectations, that is yA = xˆ and yB = (1 − xˆ).
Thus both platforms have a positive market share, there is one consumer located at
x̂ who is just indiﬀerent between buying from platform A or B. Equating (3.9) and
(3.10) and clearing x the indiﬀerent consumer is obtained:
x̂ =
tc (nA − nB)− tcnAnB (dnA − dnB) + nAnB (pB − pA + tp + v(Z − 1) + θA − θB)
2nAnB (tp + v (Z − 1))
(3.11)
The location of the indiﬀerent consumer is a function of the number of developers
of each type, the distance to the nearest developer, the degree of diﬀerentiation in
the developers market and the adoption of a common standard.
Next, we calculate the license fees. Substituting xˆ in (3.5) and (3.6) we obtain:
6In other models, if consumers do not buy some complement his utility is zero. See for example Clements (2004)
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lA =
tcxˆ
n2A
=
tc2 (nA − nB)− tc2nAnB (dnA − dnB) + tcnAnB (pB − pA + tp + v(Z − 1) + θA − θB)
2n3AnB(t
p + v(Z − 1))
(3.12)
lB =
tc(1− xˆ)
n2B
=
tc2 (nB − nA)− tc2nAnB (dnB − dnA) + tcnAnB (pA − pB + tp + v(Z − 1) + θB − θA)
2nAn3B(t
p + v(Z − 1))
(3.13)
The relationship between the number of developers and the license fees is as
follows. An increase in the number of developers produces a reduction in the license
fees. And an increase in the license fees produces a reduction in the number of
developers. Therefore, in practical terms, to consider an increase in the number
of developers is equivalent to considering a reduction in the licenses fees, they are
inversely related.
If the developers travel cost increases, the license fees will also decrease. If the
developers travel cost were zero, there would not be indirect network eﬀects. It is
required that tc > 0, in other words, we need diﬀerentiation in the developers market
to analyze the eﬀect of the indirect network externalities.
Diﬀerentiating {lA, lB} with respect to {pA, pB} we observe: an increase in the
platform price with which developers work, produces a reduction in the licenses
fees, {lA, lB}, and an increase in the rival platform price produces an increase in the
licenses fees imposed by the platform that the developer is working with.
A platform is aware that an increase in its price reduces demand. Due to the
presence of the strength of the network externality there is a decrease in its network
size and, if platforms do not adopt the standard, the reduction in its demand is
bigger. Considering the presence of the indirect network eﬀects the platform can
compensate this eﬀect via reductions in the license fees. Thus if platforms reduce the
license fees there will be an increase in their network of developers. More developers
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would add to its network and this eﬀect would compensate for the decrease in the
number of consumers due to the price increase; the ﬁnal eﬀect is a growth in the
demand. The platform can obtain higher proﬁt because revenues from consumers
go up, in spite of the reduction in the revenues from developers.
To clarify this argument, suppose that platform A increases its price. Then the
indiﬀerent consumer moves to the left; demand for platform A is lower and the
eﬀect of direct externality moves the indiﬀerent consumer even further to the left.
Nevertheless, the reduction in the license fee produces an increase in the number
of developers; this moves the indiﬀerent consumer to the right. The latter eﬀect is
stronger; the ﬁnal eﬀect on the indiﬀerent consumer is a displacement to the right.
For simplicity let us assume that the marginal cost of production is zero, and
therefore, the proﬁts of platforms A and B are given by:
piA = pA
(
tc (nA − nB)− tcnAnB (dnA − dnB) + nAnB (pB − pA + tp + v(Z − 1) + θA − θB)
2nAnB (tp + v (Z − 1))
)
+nA
(
tc2 (nA − nB)− tc2nAnB (dnA − dnB) + tcnAnB (pB − pA + tp + v(Z − 1) + θA − θB)
2n3AnB(t
p + v(Z − 1))
)
− γ
2
θ2A
(3.14)
piB = pB
(
tc (nB − nA)− tcnAnB (dnB − dnA) + nAnB (pA − pB + tp + v(Z − 1) + θB − θA)
2nAnB(tp + v(Z − 1))
)
+nB
(
tc2 (nB − nA)− tc2nAnB (dnB − dnA) + tcnAnB (pA − pB + tp + v(Z − 1) + θB − θA)
2nAn3B(t
p + v(Z − 1))
)
− γ
2
θ2B
(3.15)
The proﬁts are divided into two parts. The revenue that the platforms obtain
from developers and the revenue that they receive from consumers.
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•The pricing decision of platforms
At stage 3, platforms simultaneously choose the proﬁt maximizing price. The
solution to ∂piA
∂pA
= 0 and ∂piB
∂pB
= 0 yields:
pA =
1
3
(3tp − 3t
c
nA
+ 3v(Z − 1) + θA − θB + tc(dnB − dnA)) (3.16)
pB =
1
3
(3tp − 3t
c
nB
+ 3v(Z − 1) + θB − θA + tc(dnA − dnB)) (3.17)
Note that, equilibrium prices are a function of the strength of the network ex-
ternality, the number of developers in each platform, the developer travel cost, the
platform travel cost, the technological innovation and the diﬀerence between devel-
opers´ distances. When we introduce an incompatible market of developers, the
prices are subject to the degree of diﬀerentiation in this market and the distance to
the nearest developer. This eﬀect is caused by the presence of the indirect network
eﬀects.
Let us now take a look at the comparative statics exercise, to study how prices
change as a function of the direct and indirect network eﬀects.
i) If the platforms do not adopt the standard, an increase in the strength of the
network externality produces a price reduction in both platforms. In the contrary
case this eﬀect disappears.
ii) An increase in the number of platform i developers produces a price increase
in platform i and an increase in the number of platform j developers produces a
price reduction in platform i.
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iii) If ni > nj where i, j = a, b i 6= j an increase in the developer travel cost
produces either an increase in platform i price if ni > 3dnj−dni or a reduction if
ni <
3
dnj−dni .
If platforms do not adopt the standard, an increase in the strength of the network
externality produces a price reduction in both platforms. A reduction in the price
leads a platform to increase its market share and one increase in the market share
produces one increment in its own network size; this last eﬀect accompanied with
the strength of the network externality produces one gain in consumer utility that
buys this platform and produces a growth in the demand. Therefore, an increase in
the strength of the network externality results in stronger price competition. The
ﬁnal objective of each platform is to reduce the price to attract more consumers and
attempt to monopolize the market; in this case platforms compete for the market. 7
The second part of i) is intuitive too. If both platforms adopt the standard, then
all consumers are in the same network and platforms need not reduce their prices to
impose its technology or system; in this case platforms compete within the market.
This arises because the demand curve under standardization it is more inelastic
and without standardization is more elastic. Without a common standard positive
network externalities have the same eﬀect as a reduction in platform travel cost.
Also, an increase in the number of developers increases consumers´ willingness
to pay. A platform can increase its price and capture demand at the same time.
Moreover, if platforms do not adopt the standard and we add the eﬀect of the
strength of network externality, its demand increment by more. Its network will be
of greater size and more consumers want to be in this network.
7This result is similar to that obtained Baake and Boom (2001) when ﬁrms compete without adapter and also
to that in Navon, Shy and Thisse (1995).
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•The technological innovation decision
At stage 2, each platform makes an investment in technological innovation, sub-
stituting equations (3.13) and (3.14) into (3.11) and (3.12) and maximizing with
respect θA and θB respectively, the equilibrium level of technological innovation for
both platforms is given by:
θA =
9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)) + 3tcγ(dnB − dnA)− 2
3γ(9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)− 2)) (3.18)
θB =
9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)) + 3tcγ(dnA − dnB)− 2
3γ(9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)− 2)) (3.19)
The levels of technological innovation are a function of platforms travel cost, the
strength of the network externality, developer travel cost and the diﬀerence between
developers´ distances. If platforms do not adopt the standard, to the choice of the
level of technological innovation, direct and indirect network eﬀects are aﬀected. On
the other hand, if platforms adopt the standard, only indirect network eﬀects are
aﬀected. It is curious how the level of technological innovation does not depend
only on market structure in platforms but also on developers market. Changes in
the developers market aﬀect the innovation decisions. If one platform has a higher
network of developers, it invests more. The intuition tells us that one platform
invest more to maintain or increase its network of developers, if one platform is a
technological leader, more consumers and developers want to be in its network.
Substituting equations (3.16), (3.17), (3.18) and (3.19) into (3.14) and (3.15) we
obtain the platforms proﬁts functions as follows:
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piA =
(9(tp + v(Z − 1))γ − 1)(9(tp + v(Z − 1))γ − 1 + 3tcγ(dnB − dnA))2
18γ(2− 9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)))2 (3.20)
piB =
(9(tp + v(Z − 1))γ − 1)(9(tp + v(Z − 1))γ − 1 + 3tcγ(dnA − dnB))2
18γ(2− 9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)))2 (3.21)
Note that, by the second-order condition, for a maximum, the following assump-
tion must be satisﬁed:
Assumption 1. For (θ∗A, θ
∗
B, p
∗
A, p
∗
B) to be a maximum, it must be satisﬁed that:
If platforms do not adopt the standard tp > v and γ > 2
9(tp−v)
If platforms adopt the standard γ > 2
9tp
See Appendix.
Further note that for positive technological innovation, θA, θB, the following
assumption must be satisﬁed:
Assumption 2. Both platforms invest in technological innovation:
If platforms do not adopt the standard
And ni > nj−→tc < 9γ(tp−v)−23γ(dnj−dni) = tci(Z = 0), with i, j = A,B where i 6= j
If platforms adopt the standard
And ni > nj−→ tc < 9γtp−23γ(dnj−dni) = tci(Z = 1), with i, j = A,B where i 6= j
See Appendix.
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3.3.1.1. The standardization stage
In the following two subsections we report the values of technological innovation,
prices, license fees and platforms proﬁt. We consider ﬁrst the case where platforms
do not adopt the standard and secondly the case when they adopt it.
•Without the standard
θi =
9γ(tp − v) + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2
3γ(9γ(tp − v)− 2) i, j = A,B where i 6= j (3.22)
pi =
(ni(t
p − v)− tc)(9γ(tp − v)− 2) + 3nitcγ(tp − v)(dnj − dni)
ni(9γ(tp − v)− 2) i, j = A,B where i 6= j (3.23)
li =
tc(9γ(tp − v) + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2)
2n2i (9γ(t
p − v)− 2) i, j = A,B where i 6= j (3.24)
pii =
(9γ(tp − v)− 1)(9γ(tp − v) + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2)2
18γ(2− 9γ(tp − v))2 i, j = A,B where i 6= j
(3.25)
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•With the standard
θi =
9γtp + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2
γ(27γtp − 6) i, j = A,B where i 6= j (3.26)
pi =
(nit
p − tc)(9tpγ − 2) + 3nitctpγ(dnj − dni)
ni(9tpγ − 2) i, j = A,B where i 6= j (3.27)
li =
tc(9tpγ + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2)
2n2i (9t
pγ − 2) i, j = A,B where i 6= j (3.28)
pii =
(9tpγ − 1)(9tpγ + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2)2
18γ(2− 9tpγ)2 i, j = A,B where i 6= j (3.29)
Before moving to the ﬁrst stage, we can observe the diﬀerence in the equilibrium
variables just presented. The main diﬀerence is the presence of the strength of
the direct network externality; when platforms adopt the standard this parameter
vanishes because consumers are in the same network, independently of the strength
of the network externality. The result for the other variables of the model is going
to be symmetrical.
It is straightforward to see the role played by an unequal number of developers.
If one of the platforms has a higher number of developers, the consumers distance to
the nearest developer is lower than in the rival platform. As we can observe above,
if one of the platforms has a higher number of developers it sets a higher price, a
higher level of technological innovation and obtains higher proﬁt independently of
the standard being adopted.
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Intuitively, if a platform has a higher number of developers, this will increase
consumers' willingness to pay to belong to that network. There is a kind of vertical
diﬀerentiation element, where the most diﬀerentiated platform sets a higher price.
This eﬀect is reinforced by the presence of the strength of the network externality.
Also, the levels of technological innovation are the same if both platforms have the
same number of developers. The eﬀect on the level of technological innovation is
the same if indirect network eﬀects are not present or both platforms have the same
number of developers. The indirect network eﬀect disappears if the developers mar-
ket is not diﬀerentiated or both platforms have the same number of developers. The
intuition of this result goes as follows: for a potential consumer it is equally valuable,
for example, nine compatible complements or that each platform has nine incom-
patible complements. If this happens, consumers will value other characteristics of
the developers, such as quality, technology and so on.
We now solve the ﬁrst stage of the game. We analyze the platforms proﬁt when
they adopt the standard and when they do not adopt it.
First, we deﬁne8:
H =
(9tpγ − 2)(9γ(tp − v)− 2)
γ2(dnA − dnB)(9tp(tp − v)− 2tp + v) (3.30)
G =
√
(2− 9tpγ)2(9tpγ − 1)(9γ(tp − v)− 1)(2− 9γ(tp − v))2
γ4(dnA − dnB)2(9tpγ(tp − v)− 2tp + v)2 (3.31)
For platform A, its proﬁt will be higher with the standard if:
tc < 1
27
(H +G) = t˜cA
For platform B, its proﬁt will be higher with the standard if:
8The detailed calculation is available from the author
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tc < 1
27
(G−H) = t˜cB
Where:
t˜cA > t˜
c
B if nB > nA
t˜cA < t˜
c
B if nB < nA
The areas of equilibrium with or without the standard9:

If nA = nB:
Platforms always adopt the standard:
piA(Z = 1) > piA(Z = 0) and piB(Z = 1) > piB(Z = 0)

If nA > nB:
Platforms always adopt the standard if tc < t˜cA < tcA(Z = 1):
piA(Z = 1) > piA(Z = 0) and piB(Z = 1) > piB(Z = 0)
Platforms never adopt the standard if t˜cA < tc < tcA(Z = 0)10:
piA(Z = 0) > piA(Z = 1) and piB(Z = 1) > piB(Z = 0)

If nB > nA:
Platforms always adopt the standard if tc < t˜cB < tcB(Z = 1):
piA(Z = 1) > piA(Z = 0) and piB(Z = 1) > piB(Z = 0)
Platforms never adopt the standard if t˜cB < tc < tcB(Z = 0)11:
piA(Z = 1) > piA(Z = 0) and piB(Z = 0) > piB(Z = 1)

9The term Z=1 in parentheses means that platforms adopt the standard and the term Z=0 that they do not
adopt it.
10This only occurs when tp > 5
3
v and 2
9(tp−v) < γ <
4tp+v
18tpv
+ 1
18
√
tp(16tp−24v)+v2
tp2v2
11This only occurs when tp > 5
3
v and 2
9(tp−v) < γ <
4tp+v
18tpv
+ 1
18
√
tp(16tp−24v)+v2
tp2v2
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If one of the two platforms has a lower number of developers it is ready to establish
the standard for a wider range of diﬀerentiation in the developers market. This
arises from the interaction of direct and indirect network eﬀects. Indirect network
externalities through the travel cost in the developers market plays a crucial role in
the platforms decisions. As can be observed in ﬁgures 3.3 and 3.4, the platform with
a lower number of developers is ready to establish the standard when the developers
travel cost is high enough, but the platform with a higher number of developers
obtains a higher proﬁt if it does not adopt the standard. When the developers travel
cost is low, both platforms adopt the standard. In the beginning, if the developers
travel cost is very high, more consumers will want to purchase the platform with
more developers and this platform will not want to adopt the standard. The eﬀect
of the direct network eﬀect increases with the decrease in the developer´s travel cost
and the eﬀect of the indirect network eﬀects also decreases with the decreasing in
the developers travel cost.
The following lemma summarizes the earlier argument:
LEMMA 1. If the degree of diﬀerentiation in the developers market is suﬃ-
ciently low, then the platforms adopt the standard. Alternatively, if the degree of
diﬀerentiation in the developers market is suﬃciently high, then the platforms do
not adopt the standard.
If ni > nj and tc < t˜ci < tci(Z = 1) where i, j {A,B} i 6= j or ni = nj, platforms
always adopt the standard.
Figure 3.3: Equilibrium with standard.
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If ni > nj and t˜i
c
< tc < tci(Z = 0) where i, j {A,B} i 6= j, platforms never
adopt the standard.
Figure 3.4: Equilibrium without standard.
If the degree of diﬀerentiation in the developers market is suﬃciently low, then
the platforms adopt the standard, in this case the platforms network shares are
important to consumers. Both platforms can obtain higher proﬁts because they can
establish higher prices. It is the same that happens if indirect network eﬀects are not
present, consumers accept to pay a higher price to be in the same network. When
the developer travel cost is low, the developers market is less important.
On the contrary case, if the degree of diﬀerentiation in the developers market
is suﬃciently high, then the platforms do not adopt the standard, in this case the
developers market becomes important to consumers. The platform with a lower
number of developers is at a disadvantage with respect to the other platform, more
consumers will want to purchase the rival platform, and by the presence of con-
sumers' expectations it will have a smaller network size. One enters in a spiral of
higher number of developers, higher demand and higher network size that ﬁnishes
with the platform with fewer developers out of the market. This platform can reduce
this eﬀect if the standard is adopted, but the rival platform never wants to adopt it.
The propensity for the market to standardize with fulﬁlled expectations is subject
to three factors:
LEMMA 2. In the presence of direct and indirect network eﬀects, if ni > nj
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i = A,B where i 6= j, the propensity to standardize the market increases if: (i)
the strength of the network eﬀect decreases, (ii) the number of type i developers
decreases, (iii) the number of type j developers increases, and (iii) the platform
travel cost increases.
If ni > nj i = A,B where i 6= j, the condition for higher proﬁts in platform i
with the standard is given by:
t˜ci =
1
27
(
(9tpγ − 2)(9γ(tp − v)− 2)
γ2(dni − dnj)(9tp(tp − v)− 2tp + v) +
√
(2− 9tpγ)2(9tpγ − 1)(9γ(tp − v)− 1)(2− 9γ(tp − v))2
γ4(dni − dnj)2(9tpγ(tp − v)− 2tp + v)2
)
(3.32)
Figure 3.5: Propensity for the market to standardize.
On the left side of this ﬁgure both platforms adopt the standard and on the right
side they do not adopt it. Also, (ii) and (iii) imply that standardization is less or
more likely for a greater number of software ﬁrms. The same result is found by
Church and Gandal (1992): standardization is more likely before an increase in type
j developers. More recently, Clements (2004) obtains a similar result. 12.
The ﬁrst factor is the strength of the network externality: an increase in the
strength of the externality reduces the incentive to adopt a standard. If one platform
becomes a monopolist the proﬁt is enormous. The second factor is the platform
travel cost: an increase in the platform travel cost produces an incentive to adopt
a standard increases, the consumers will not accept paying a higher travel cost,
12The reason for the diﬀerence is that software prices in Clements (2004) model depend on the number of ﬁrms
in the industry and software prices in Church and Gandal's model do not depend on the number of ﬁrms in the
industry.
74
so platforms can reduce this eﬀect with the standard. And the third factor is the
diﬀerence between the number of developers:
If the diﬀerence between the number of developers increases, the propensity for
the market to standardize decreases and if the diﬀerence between the number of
developers decreases, the propensity for the market to standardize increases. The
more equals the number of developers between both platforms, the more incentives
they have to adopt the standard because the platforms can obtain higher proﬁts.
Taking into account lemma 2; when the strength of network externality is in-
creased or the number of type i developers is increased, the function t˜ci moves to
the left and decreases the range where both platforms obtain higher proﬁts with the
standard. On the other hand, when platforms travel cost is increased or the number
of type j developers is increased, the function t˜ci moves to the right and increases
the range where both platforms obtain higher proﬁts with standard.
Increases in v and ni reduce the propensity for the market to standardize and
increases in tp and nj increase the propensity for the market to standardize.
This result is the same as the one obtained by Bender and Schmidt (2007), these
authors found that if the strength of the network externality is high, it is less likely
to adopt the standard. The model structure of these authors is similar to our
model, except for the presence of developers markets. They analyse three diﬀerent
types of equilibria, the ﬁrst equilibrium they analyze is identical to ours, a symmet-
ric equilibrium where both platforms are used in the market. Then they consider
the case where only one of the two platforms involved in the market. And ﬁnally
they consider a combination of the earlier two. Their results depend on platforms
transportation cost, with a higher cost, it is less likely that the platforms adopt the
standard. Therefore, for these authors, increases in strength of the network external-
ity increases the travel cost required for the adoption of the standard and therefore
reduces the possibility to adopt the standard. The diﬀerence is the speciﬁcation in
the indirect utility function, but in order to model development it can be seen that
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the results are identical.
In contrast, in the work of Clements (2004), we have the opposite result; increases
in the strength of the network externality increases the possibility to adopt the
standard. In this chapter the utility functions is diﬀerent. The main change is that
if consumers do not buy a complement, in the utility is zero. When indirect network
externalities are not present, there are two possible equilibrium depending on the
platforms travel cost, there exists a threshold in the platforms travel cost where they
do not adopt the standard, and by increasing the strength of the network externality
this threshold is higher.
3.3.2 Non-Fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium
In this section we consider that consumers expectations focus on platform A
(yA = 1, yB = 0). The same results would be obtained if consumers expectations
focus on platform B (yA = 0, yB = 1), but inversely.
Assuming that both platforms have a positive market share there is one consumer
located at x̂ who is just indiﬀerent between buying from A or B. This consumer is
given by
xˆ =
tc (nA − nB) + tcnAnB(dnB − dnA) + nAnB (pB − pA + tp + v(1− Z) + θA − θB)
2nAnBtp
(3.33)
We can calculate the license fees, substituting xˆ into (3.5) and (3.6) as follows:
lA =
tcx̂
n2A
=
tc2 (nA − nB) + tc2nAnB(dnB − dnA) + tcnAnB (pB − pA + tp + v(1− Z) + θA − θB)
2n3AnBt
p
(3.34)
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lB =
tc(1− x̂)
n2B
=
tc2 (nB − nA) + tc2nAnB(dnA − dnB) + tcnAnB(pA − pB + tp + v(Z − 1) + θB − θA)
2nAn3Bt
p
(3.35)
The presence of direct network externalities aﬀects not only consumers and plat-
forms, but also developers:
If platforms do not adopt the standard, an increase in the strength of the network
externality, v, produces an increase in type A licenses fees and a reduction in type
B licenses fees. In the contrary case this eﬀect disappears.
•The pricing decision of platforms
At stage 3, platforms simultaneously choose the proﬁt maximizing price. The
solution to ∂piA
∂pA
= 0 and ∂piB
∂pB
= 0 yields:
pA =
1
3
(
3tp + v (1− Z) + θA − θB − 3t
c
nA
+ tc (dnB − dnA)
)
(3.36)
pB =
1
3
(
3tp + v (Z − 1) + θB − θA − 3t
c
nB
+ tc (dnA − dnB)
)
(3.37)
Note that the prices are a function of the strength of the network externality, the
number of developers of each platform, the developers travel cost, the platform travel
cost, technological innovation and the diﬀerence between developers´ distances.
If platforms do not adopt the standard, an increase in the strength of the network
externality produces one increase in platform A price and one reduction in platform
B price. In the contrary case this eﬀect disappears.
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In case platforms adopt the standard we get the same result that in fulﬁlled Nash
equilibrium because standardization eliminates the expected advantage of platform
A13. In contrast to the type 1 Nash equilibrium, if platforms do not adopt the stan-
dard, an increase in the strength of the network externality produces an increase
in platform A price, and a reduction in platform B price. If platform B has no
expectations from consumers and there is an increase in the strength of the network
externality, then its demand decreases. To compensate this eﬀect platform B re-
sponds by lowering price to attract consumers; in spite of it, the decrease in price
is not reﬂected in an increment in its network size because consumers' expectations
are focused on platform A.
The only way that platform B can compete in the market is through price, in a
standard common market thus would lead to a demand increase. However, direct
network eﬀects become a key factor, albeit not the only one that consumers to care
when making decisions. Taking this into account, platform B can compete in the
market with a rather small market share.
In the developers market we have similar ﬁndings as in fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium.
•The technological innovation decision
At stage 2, each platform make an investment in technological innovation, sub-
stituting equations (3.36) and (3.37) in the proﬁts functions and maximizing with
respect θA and θB, the equilibrium level of technological innovation for both plat-
forms is given by:
θA =
2− 9tpγ + 3v(Z − 1)γ − 3tcγ(dnB − dnA)
3γ(2− 9tpγ) (3.38)
13The results are given by equations (3.26), (3.27), (3.28) and (3.29).
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θB =
2− 9tpγ + 3v(1− Z)γ − 3tcγ(dnA − dnB)
3γ(2− 9tpγ) (3.39)
In this case, the levels of technological innovation are a function of platforms
travel cost, the strength of the network externality, developer travel cost and the
diﬀerence between developers´ distances. If platforms do not adopt the standard,
platform A will choose more level of technological innovation. On the other hand,
if platforms adopt the standard occur the same that in fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium.
Regardless of standardization happening or not, and of fulﬁlled expectations or
not the investment in technological innovation will always be the same. The ag-
gregate level of technological innovation is constant throughout all the model.It is
given by θ∗A + θ
∗
B =
2
3γ
. The aggregate level of innovation is independent of direct
and indirect network eﬀects.
Note that, by the second-order condition, to obtain a maximum, the next as-
sumption is required.
Assumption 3. For (θ∗A, θ
∗
B,p
∗
A, p
∗
B) to be a maximum, it must be satisﬁed that:
γ > 1
9tp
Further note that for positive technological innovation, θA, θB, the following
assumption must be satisﬁed:
Assumption 4. Both platforms invest in technological innovation if:
tp > v
3
, γ > 2
3(3tp−v) and:
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ni > nj−→ tc < 2−3γ(3tp−v)3γ(dni−dnj) , i, j = A,B where i 6= j
nj > ni−→ tc < 2−3γ(3tp−v)3γ(dnj−dni) , i, j = A,B where i 6= j
3.3.2.1. The standardization stage
We will not discuss the case in which platforms adopt the standard (Z = 1),
the results obtained are the same as for the fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium. If platforms
adopt the standard, consumer´s expectations are irrelevant, every user is in the
same network independently of which platform has more consumers.
Therefore, we only analyze the case when platforms do not adopt the standard
(Z = 0). The equilibrium levels of technological innovation, prices and proﬁts are
given by:
θA =
2− 9γ(tp + v
3
)− 3tcγ(dnB − dnA)
γ(6− 27tpγ) (3.40)
θB =
2− 9γ(tp − v
3
)− 3tcγ(dnA − dnB)
γ(6− 27tpγ) (3.41)
pA =
tc(2− 9tpγ) + nAtp(3γ(3tp + v)− 2) + 3nAtctpγ(dnB − dnA)
nA(9tpγ − 2) (3.42)
pB =
tc(2− 9tpγ) + nBtp(3γ(3tp − v)− 2) + 3nBtctpγ(dnA − dnB)
nB(9tpγ − 2) (3.43)
piA =
(9tpγ − 1)(3γ(3tp + v + tc(dnB − dnA))− 2)2
18γ(2− 9tpγ)2 (3.44)
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piB =
(9tpγ − 1)(3γ(3tp − v + tc(dnA − dnB))− 2)2
18γ(2− 9tpγ)2 (3.45)
The proﬁts comparison with and without the standard, equation (3.29) with
(3.44) and (3.45), yields:
piA (Z = 0) > piA(Z = 1)
piB (Z = 1) > piB(Z = 0)
Platform A always obtains a higher proﬁt if it does not adopt the standard, as
it can establish a higher price because consumer expectations are focused on plat-
form A. On the other hand, platform B always prefers to adopt the standard, since
standardization eliminates the expected advantage, it can ﬁx a higher price. All
consumers want to be in platform A, but if platforms adopt the standard then con-
sumer who buy platform A or B is in the same network. In conclusion, if consumer
expectations are focused in one of the platforms, the standard will never be adopted,
because in this case, platform A never wants to adopt it.
LEMMA 3. If consumers expect that only one of the platforms serves the mar-
ket, the standard will never be adopted.
The Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium when consumers´expectations focus on
platform A are given by the values of (p∗A, p
∗
B, θ
∗
A, θ
∗
B, Z
∗) , where:
Z∗ = 0
θ∗A =
2− 9γ(tp + v
3
)− 3tcγ(dnB − dnA)
γ(6− 27tpγ)
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θ∗B =
2− 9γ(tp − v
3
)− 3tcγ(dnA − dnB)
γ(6− 27tpγ)
p∗A =
tc(2− 9tpγ) + nAtp(3γ(3tp + v)− 2) + 3nAtctpγ(dnB − dnA)
nA(9tpγ − 2)
p∗B =
tc(2− 9tpγ) + nBtp(3γ(3tp − v)− 2) + 3nBtctpγ(dnA − dnB)
nB(9tpγ − 2)
Although platform B has no expectations from consumers, it can still have a
positive market share due to its low price. In an extreme case it could monopolize
the market.
In particular, this may happen if platform B establishes a price such that
pB ≤ t
c(2− 9tpγ) + 2nBtp(3γ(3tp − v)− 2) + 6nBtctpγ(dnA − dnB)
nB(9tpγ − 2) (3.46)
This price is so low, that allows platform B to be present in the market. Direct
and indirect network eﬀects are key factors in consumers' decisions, but such a low
price compensates the zero expectations on platform B network size. Platform B
takes a judo economics strategy; he takes advantage of its smaller size and price
to take part in the market. Platform B is capable of convincing platform A, by its
insigniﬁcant market share, that it does not suppose a threat. The presence of the
indirect network eﬀects can make this threat real, when nB > nA and vdnA−dnB <
tc < 3γ(3t
p+v)−2
3γ(dnA−dnB) .
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Speciﬁcally, when nB > nA and tc = vdnA−dnB , platforms obtain the same proﬁt,
the same demand and choose the same level of technological innovation. The equi-
librium values of (θA, θB, pA, pB) and platforms proﬁt are:
pA = t
p − v
nA(dnA−dnB) , pB = t
p + v
nB(dnB−dnA) , θA = θB =
1
3γ
, DA = DB = 12 ,
piA = piB =
9tpγ−1
18γ
where, pB > pA and lA > lB. Platform B obtains a higher revenue from con-
sumers, while platform A obtains a higher revenue from developers. Platform A has
a smaller number of developers and it charges higher license fees. Consider the level
of developers travel cost, tc = v
dnA−dnB . Below this cost the developer market will
have a greater eﬀect on consumer decisions than direct eﬀects.
This eﬀect is due to a greater presence of type B developers. If platform B had a
higher number of developers and indirect network eﬀects were extremely strong, it
could monopolize the market. Thus, if the developers market is suﬃciently diﬀeren-
tiated, the platform B sets a higher price, a higher level of technological innovation
and it obtains a higher demand, despite the fact that consumers' expectations are
focused on platform A.
Platforms do not adopt the standard because platform A is able to set a higher
price without a standard, even in the case where platform B has a higher market
share.
Corollary. If consumers expect that both platforms will serve the market, then
the decision to adopt a standard depends on the degree of diﬀerentiation in the
developers market. Alternatively, if consumers expect that only one of the platform
serves the market, platforms will not adopt the standard.
Summary;
•If consumers expect that both platforms serve the market (fulﬁlled expectations),
yA = x̂, yB = (1− x̂), the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is given by:
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When ni > nj and tc < t˜ci < tci(Z = 1), i, j = A,B where i 6= j :
Z∗ = 1
θ∗i =
9γtp+3tcγ(dnj−dni)−2
γ(27γtp−6) ; i, j = A,B where i 6= j
p∗i =
(nit
p−tc)(9tpγ−2)+3nitctpγ(dnj−dni)
ni(9tpγ−2) ; i, j = A,B where i 6= j
When ni > nj and t˜i
c
< tc < tci(Z = 0), i, j = A,B where i 6= j :
Z∗ = 0
θ∗i =
9γ(tp−v)+3tcγ(dnj−dni)−2
3γ(9γ(tp−v)−2) ; i, j = A,B where i 6= j
p∗i =
(ni(t
p−v)−tc)(9γ(tp−v)−2)+3natcγ(tp−v)(dnj−dni)
ni(9γ(tp−v)−2) ; i, j = A,B where i 6= j
•If consumers expect that only one of the platforms serves the market, yA = 1,
yB = 0 , the Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium is given by:
Z∗ = 0
θ∗A =
2−9γ(tp+ v
3
)−3tcγ(dnB−dnA)
γ(6−27tpγ)
θ∗B =
2−9γ(tp− v
3
)−3tcγ(dnA−dnB)
γ(6−27tpγ)
p∗A =
tc(2−9tpγ)+nAtp(3γ(3tp+v)−2)+3nAtctpγ(dnB−dnA)
nA(9tpγ−2)
p∗B =
tc(2−9tpγ)+nBtp(3γ(3tp−v)−2)+3nBtctpγ(dnA−dnB)
nB(9tpγ−2)
If consumers expect that both platforms will serve the market, depending on the
degree of diﬀerentiation in the developers market, platforms adopt the standard or
not. On the other hand, if consumers expect that only one platform will serve the
market, platforms never adopt the standard. Katz and Shapiro (1985) obtain that
the platform with a large network does not adopt the standard, although their model
does not consider indirect network eﬀects.
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3.4. Welfare Analysis
In this section we study the welfare implications of fulﬁlled Nash equilibrium with
fulﬁlled expectations. We compare the welfare when platforms do not adopt the
standard and when they adopt it; to get a better grasp of the welfare changes we
analyze separately consumer and producer surplus, which consist of platforms and
developers proﬁts.
3.4.1. Total Welfare
Proposition 3. Total welfare is higher with the standard if
tc <
1√
3
√
(2− 9tpγ)2(2− 9γ(tp − v))2
γ2(9γ(4v + tp(45γ(tp − v)− 8))− 4)(dnA − dnB)2 = t
cw (3.47)
3.4.2. Consumer surplus
Proposition 4. Consumer surplus is always higher without the standard
EC(Z = 0) > EC(Z = 1)
3.4.3. Producer surplus
Proposition 5. Producer Surplus is higher with the standard if
tc <
1
9
√
(2− 9tpγ)2(2− 9γ(tp − v))2
γ3(v − 2tp + 9tpγ)(tp − v))(dnA − dnB)2 = t
cPS (3.48)
where tcPS > tcw .
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Taking into account propositions 3 and 5 we distinguish three areas:
When tc < tcw < tcPS, total welfare is higher with the standard because producers
gain is greater than consumers losses . (Area 1)
When tcw < tc < tcPS, total welfare is higher without the standard because
if platforms adopt the standard consumer loss is greater than the producers gain.
(Area 2)
When tcw < tcPS < tc, total welfare is higher without the standard. Consumer
and producer surplus is higher without the standard. (Area 3)
C:/Users/Ignacio/Desktop/Latest/Capitulos/Chapter 3-Standardization and Network Effects/Figuras/Bienestar/Welfare.png
Figure 3.6: Welfare.
As can be observed in ﬁgure 3.6, total welfare is explained by what happens
to producer surplus since consumer surplus is always higher without the standard.
This occurs because when platforms adopt the standard we observe two eﬀects: the
variety and the price eﬀect.
The variety eﬀect arises since one variety is lost when a standard is imposed. If
platforms do not adopt the standard we will have two systems in the market. There
is a trade-oﬀ between standardization and variety. The second one is the price
eﬀect, when platforms adopt the standard, they maintain a high monopoly power
and charge high prices to obtain higher proﬁts. In these markets consumers pay a
higher price when they all belong to the same network. The adoption of a common
standard produces limitations in variety and increases in prices. If platforms do not
adopt the standard, price competition will be stronger because each platform will
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want to impose its system in the market. If platforms adopt the standard, price
competition dampens; all consumers are in the same network and one system is
imposed.
We can see that some standardization choices of platforms are ineﬃcient. Taking
into account propositions 4 and 5 and equation (3.32) there exist two ineﬃcient
areas14:
The ﬁrst case, when tcw < tc < t˜ci
Figure 3.7: The welfare is higher without the standard.
In this case platforms adopt the standard but welfare is higher without it; W (Z =
0) > W (Z∗ = 1).
The second case, when t˜ci < t
c < tcw
Figure 3.8: The welfare is higher with the standard.
In this case platforms do not adopt the standard but welfare is higher with it;
W (Z = 1) > W (Z∗ = 0).
14This result is opposite to the welfare result in Clement (2004). The diﬀerence is due to the modeling of consumer
preferences. He obtains that there is no equilibrium in which there is ineﬃcient standardization with direct network
externalities.
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These ineﬃcient standardization choices and the increases in prices when plat-
forms adopt the standard and when they do not adopt it can justify the regulation
in the telecommunications and technological markets, although the network eﬀects
are very hardly resoluble through the defense mechanisms of the competition.
3.6. Conclusion
In the ﬁrst part of the chapter we have considered fulﬁlled expectations, in this
setting, if the degree of diﬀerentiation in the developers market is suﬃciently high;
then the platforms will not adopt a standard. Alternatively, if the degree of diﬀer-
entiation in the developers market is suﬃciently low, then the platforms will adopt
a standard. With fulﬁlled expectations the propensity for the market to standardize
is subject to the platforms travel cost, the strength of the network externality and
the diﬀerence between the number of developers. In the second part, we analyze the
extreme case of expectations of a single platform. In this case platforms will not
adopt a standard. Finally, we analyze total welfare under the fulﬁlled expectations
setting. We observe two eﬀects, the variety and the price eﬀect; as a consequence,
the consumer surplus is always higher without the standard. In this chapter, we
consider the presence of direct and indirect network externalities in the same model.
The direct network externalities are present by the consumers' expectations on the
platforms network sizes, the above mentioned expectations are a key factor in the
consumer's decision making. In the network models the available technology is
valued taking into account other features in addition to the price. The indirect net-
work externalities appear by the market of developers, the presence of developers in
a platform increase consumers' willingness to pay for this platform.
If the platforms do not adopt the standard, then the travel costs are important
to the consumers, given that the consumers will rather prefer the largest network;
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consumers will be ready to pay a higher travel cost to belong to the same network.
The presence of the indirect network externalities, in certain conditions, can do that
a platform that has no expectation from the consumers ﬁnishes with a high mar-
ket share, it can become a monopoly. Unlike what happens in traditional markets,
in these markets, one increases in the price does not reﬂected in reductions in the
demand. Increases in the strength of the network externality or increases in the
number of developers, lead to a platform to increase its price and produce a growth
in its demand. Also, we observe that before the presence of indirect network eﬀects,
the platforms are capable of giving away for free (to ﬁx negative price), this can be
observed in the real life in the markets telecommunications, in operating systems
markets, web browsers, mobile applications... Our results when the consumers ex-
pect that both platforms will serve the market support the obtained by Casadesus
and Masanell (2009), when the consumers are heterogeneous, the platforms adopt
the standard, establish higher prices and obtain a higher proﬁts.
We analyze the propensity for the market to standardize with fulﬁlled expecta-
tions, and we observe that it is subject to three factors, i) if the diﬀerence between
the number of developers increases, the propensity for the market to standardize
decreases and ii) if the diﬀerence between the number of developers decreases, the
propensity for the market to standardize increases. The more equals the number
of developers between both platforms, the more incentives they have to adopt the
standard because the platforms can obtain higher proﬁts. And iii) if the platform
travel cost increases, the propensity for the market to standardize increases.
If the platforms adopt the standard, they maintain high monopoly power and
charge high prices and obtain higher proﬁts. These increases in prices can justify the
regulation in the telecommunication markets and especially in the interconnection
between operators, telephone or Internet operators. When we have compared the
total welfare, it is higher with the standard, producers gain is greater than the
consumer's losses. The consumer surplus is always higher without the standard.
These occur because when platforms adopt the standard we observe two eﬀects:
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Variety and Price eﬀects. When the platforms adopt the standard one system is
imposed, we loss one variety. If platform will not adopt the standard we will have
two systems in the market. The consumers pay a higher price by all belonging to
the same network. We can observe a trade oﬀ, Variety Vs Standardization. The
adoption of a common standard produces limitations in variety and increases in
prices.
Finally, we observe some ineﬃcient standardization choices that can justify the
regulation in the telecommunications and technological markets
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3.7. Appendix
3.7.1. Proof of Assumption 1
By the second order condition from the technological innovation decision we obtain:
∂2piA
∂θ2A
=
1
9(tp + v(Z − 1)) − γ
and we need that ∂
2piA
∂θ2A
< 0, it will be less than zero when
1
9(tp + v(Z − 1)) − γ < 0 −→
1
9(tp + v(Z − 1)) < γ −→ γ >
1
9(tp − v(1− Z))
When platforms adopt the standard, Z = 1, γ > 1
9tp
and
when they do not adopt it, Z = 0, γ > 1
9(tp−v) and t
p > v.
3.7.2. Proof of Assumption 2
From the technological innovation decision we have that θi = 9γ(t
p+v(Z−1))+3tcγ(dnj−dni)−2
3γ(9γ(tp+v(Z−1)−2))
and we assume that both platform invest a positive amount:
9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)) + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2
3γ(9γ(tp + v(Z − 1)− 2)) > 0 −→ 9γ(t
p + v(Z − 1)) + 3tcγ(dnj − dni)− 2 > 0 −→
3tcγ(dnj−dni) > −9γ(tp+v(Z−1))+2 −→ tc > −9γ(t
p + v(Z − 1)) + 2
3γ(dnj − dni) −→ t
c <
9γ(tp + v(Z − 1))− 2
3γ(dnj − dni)
When platforms adopt the standard, Z = 1, tc < 9γt
p−2
3γ(dni−dnj) and
when they do not adopt it, Z = 0, tc < 9γ(t
p−v)−2
3γ(dni−dnj) .
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Chapter 4. Platforms, Software and Piracy in a two-sided market
4.1. Introduction
Many technological markets are formed mainly by platforms, software developers
and consumers. Consumers usually need to buy software products to use the plat-
forms, but in these types of markets the consumers can get illegal copies of software.
Many of these platforms will not work without software applications; if consumers
purchase a platform alone they will not obtain any utility, they need to combine it
with applications. For example, in the console market the consumers need to buy
the console and games.
These types of markets are two-sided, with the presence of network externalities
in consumption, speciﬁcally by two-sided externalities. In the console market the
platforms (Xbox 360 and PlayStation) compete to attract game developers and to
attract consumers. If one platform has a large variety of games, more consumers are
willing to buy it and if one platform has a large number of consumers, more game
developers want to develop games for this platform. Now, the network externalities
do not aﬀect the same side of the market, on the consumer side they base their
decision by taking into account the number of games and not according to the
number of consumers who have the same console.
A further example is the market of mobile operating systems. Consumers decide
whether to buy a mobile with Android or a mobile with iOS, from Google or from
Apple and the software developers decide if they create applications for one of the
two operating systems or for both. If a developer wants to work with Apple he will
pay $9915 per year and if he wants to work with Google they will pay $2516 per
year. Consumers can buy the software developers applications in the online stores,
App Store or Google Play, but they can also obtain illegal copies. In these markets
15https://developer.apple.com/programs/which-program
16In this case Google also charged a royalty of 30% by application sold. http://www.android.com/uk/developer-
distribution-agreement.html#showlanguages
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we ﬁnd applications that work exclusively with Apple or with Google but the most
common is that the software developers in the mobile markets use a multi-homing
strategy and produce software for both platforms.
In the personal computer market we ﬁnd a similar case: both platforms, Mac and
Windows, compete to attract consumers and software developers.
Finally, we may consider the market of e-books with, for example, Amazon or with
Smashwords17. The platforms obtain income from selling books and from authors
who want to publish their books. In this case the developers are the authors 18.
A common problem for software developers in the markets for digital goods is
piracy. Piracy of digital content is considered a serious problem by content compa-
nies. In this type of markets, it is relatively easy obtain a copy. Then users only
face the moral dilemma about violating the property rights.
The diﬀerent software developers are members of diﬀerent associations against
piracy. For example, in the Business Software Alliance (BSA) are Adobe, Apple,
Intel, Microsoft and McAfee, among others19.
The diﬀerent types of software associations declare their position against piracy
but we can ﬁnd other developers who confess that piracy may be good.
For example, the company Rovio Mobiles said in a conference that piracy may
not be a bad thing: it can get us more business, they believe that it allows them
to attract new users. The Nero Boss declares that piracy has made us grow, so
instead of investing time and eﬀort in anti-piracy mechanisms, we prefer to improve
product quality. Unity Technologies has declared that: Piracy can be a way to
seed a market. Nobody will ever fully conquer the piracy problem, but we can
certainly turn it to our advantage and the Mojang A B boss said: Desperate to
try the blocky indie sensation Minecraft but can't aﬀord the $ 26.95 price tag? Just
17Smashwords is an e-book publishing and distribution platform for e-book authors, publishers, agents and readers.
More information at http://www.smashwords.com
18In this case the platforms charge royalties to the publishers, while in our model we only consider license
fees. See for price information https://kdp.amazon.com/self-publishing/help?topicId=A29FL26OKE7R7B and
http://www.smashwords.com/about/how_to_publish_on_smashwords
19All members can be found at http://www.bsa.org/country/BSA%20and%20Members/Our%20Members.aspx
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pirate it.
A 2009 survey conducted by TIGA20 about the piracy demonstrates that devel-
opers view the actual threat of piracy to their business survival as low (60%) with
only 20% ranking the threat as medium and only 10% considering the threat to be
high (10% had no view). For these developers piracy is a problem, but not a threat
to survival.
The problem of piracy was analyzed by the Business Software Alliance (BSA),
21in the last report22 they estimated the losses in 2010 due to piracy and estimated
that the worldwide piracy rate is 42%. According to this association, about half
of the world population pirate or copy software products. The problem of this
information is that it cannot be real because piracy losses are calculated with the
following methodology: Number of Unlicensed Units Installed multiplied by Average
Software Unit Price equal to The Commercial Value of Pirated Software.
The problem of this approach arises because not everyone that copies software
would buy it if he had to pay for the product. Therefore, to consider pirated software
as a lost sale can be misleading.
In this chapter we analyze the piracy problem in a two-sided market. Four possi-
ble scenarios are distinguished depending on whether consumers and/or developers
are following single-homing or multi-homing strategies. The ﬁrst scenario is where
only consumers use a multi-homing strategy whereas developers stick to a single
platform; in the second, consumers and developers follow a single-homing strategy
(and work with just one platform); the third scenario considers that only developers
use a multi-homing strategy; and the fourth scenario has both agents multi-homing
and use both platforms. We wish to characterize the equilibrium prices paid by
20TIGA is the non-proﬁt trade association representing the UK's games industry. See http://www.tiga.org/
21Business Software Alliance (BSA) is a nonproﬁt trade association created to advance the goals of the software
industry and its hardware partners. It is the foremost organization dedicated to promoting a safe and legal digital
world. BSA acts to protect software providers' intellectual property rights, enforce software copyright legislation,
and encourage compliance. It receives thousands of reports from end users, resellers, law enforcement, members,
and aﬃliate associations detailing the alleged use of unlicensed and illegal software. You can ﬁnd more information
about BSA at http://www.bsa.org
22http://portal.bsa.org/globalpiracy2011/downloads/study_pdf/2011_BSA_Piracy_Study-Standard.pdf
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consumers and the equilibrium license fees borne by developers in the presence of
software piracy, and to study whether the software developers actually lose with
piracy. We consider a two-sided market where platforms interact with software de-
velopers and consumers and another market where consumers decide whether to
buy the original software from the developers or obtain an illegal copy. Finally, the
model considers the possibility that developers invest in an anti-piracy mechanism
to protect their software.
Our main results reveal that piracy may be a problem for the software developers
depending on the type of scenario. An decrease in the platform license fee is realized
in the ﬁrst scenario where only consumers use a multi-homing strategy. There are
developers who are against piracy and others not. This reﬂects why in the real world
some developers might be in favour and others against piracy .
In a single-homing scenario more piracy will reduce the developers license fees,
therefore the platforms obtain a lower proﬁt because they have to reduce the license
fees to attract more developers. Software developers are better oﬀ with more piracy,
but platforms are against it.
In the most common scenario in real life - consumers only buy or join one platform
and developers may be single-homing and multi-homing -, the variations in the price,
license fee and in platforms proﬁts depend on several factors.
In the latter case, with consumers and developers multi-homing, we found that
platform proﬁts always increase with more piracy.
Finally, in the last part of the chapter we provide a welfare analysis under all
scenarios, it is shown that in three of the four scenarios the piracy is desirable, and
calculate the social optimum when a social planner regulates the consumers and the
developers market.
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4.2. The Model
This section introduces a model of software piracy in a two-sided market.
4.2.1. Platforms
There are two horizontally diﬀerentiated platforms in the Hotelling line [0, 1], A and
B. We assume that platform A is located on the left end and platform B is located
on the right end. For the sake of the exposition we assume that the marginal cost
of production is zero. The platforms´ income is divided into two parts; the revenue
that the platforms obtain from developers and the revenue that they obtain from
consumers; platforms charge an access price to consumers, denoted by {pA, pB} and
a license fee to the software developers, denoted by {lA, lB}.
4.2.2. Software Developers and platforms
Developers are uniformly distributed on the unit line with respect to their preference
for platforms. The total mass of developers in the market is one. The location of a
developer with respect to platforms is denoted by z, z [0, 1].
The indirect utility of a developer z who joins either platform is given by
V (z) =

β − lA − tcz + uAv, if joining A
β − lB − tc(1− z) + uBv, if joining B
(4.1)
Software developers obtain a reservation utility level, β. It is assumed that it
is large enough to ensure that all developers will work with one of the platforms.
Thus, the software developers market is covered.
Developers pay a license fee to work with one of the two platforms. For example,
in the video games market, the platforms charge a per unit license fee on the game
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that the software developers produce for one of the two platforms; in this model
such per unit license fee is represented by li, i {A,B}.
The software developers decision is aﬀected by the share of consumers subscribed
to one of the two platforms. Thus, the eﬀect of the network externality in the devel-
opers market is accounted for, because developers want to work with the platform
with the highest number of users. It is clear that if the number of platform A users
is higher, more developers will wish to work with platform A and vice versa for plat-
form B. This is represented by the number of users of each platform, ui, i {A,B}
and v, where v > 0, corresponds with the strength of the network externality and
measures the importance of the number of users for the software developers. Finally,
tc measures the degree of diﬀerentiation between platforms from the point of view
of the developers.
4.2.3. Consumers and platforms
Consumers are uniformly distributed on the unit line with respect to their preference
for platforms. The location of a consumer with respect to platforms is denoted by
x,x [0, 1]. The total mass of consumers is one. The indirect utility of a consumer x
who joins either platform is given by
U(x) =

V − tpx− pA + nAλ, if joining A
V − tp(1− x)− pB + nBλ, if joining B
(4.2)
Consumers obtain a reservation utility level, V . It is assumed to be large enough
to ensure that all consumers will buy from one of the platforms. Thus, the consumers
market is covered. The consumer obtains extra utility if the share of software de-
velopers that work with the same platform is high. This eﬀect is reﬂected by the
parameter ni, i {A,B} and by the strength of the network externality, λ, where
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λ > 0. Finally, consumers will pay a price pi, i {A,B} and the parameter tp mea-
sures the degree of diﬀerentiation of the platforms from the consumers point of
view.
The market is seen from diﬀerent perspectives by consumers and developers and
we consider that the degrees of diﬀerentiation tc and tp are diﬀerent.
4.2.4. Consumers and software developers
We assume that consumers can copy a developer´s application already in the mar-
ket23. Therefore they decide whether to buy the legal software or to obtain a copy
for free yet it may be of lesser quality24.
We use a framework where legal and illegal software are vertically diﬀerentiated
and where the software developers have the possibility to invest in an anti-piracy
mechanism. This mechanism can stop the creation of a copy. Software developers
can invest a quantity k, where k (0, 1), in an anti-piracy mechanism at a cost c(k),
where ∂c(k)
∂k
= c > 0.
We assume that each software developer behaves like a monopoly and that users
may buy one unit of software from each software developer working with the same
platform to which the consumer is subscribed; alternatively, they may get an illegal
copy for free.
Consumers diﬀer in their valuation θ for software. It is assumed that θ is uni-
formly distributed on [0, 1]. The indirect utility of user θ for each software unit is
given by
U(θ) =

θ − po if buys the original product
θδ(1− k) if gets a copy
(4.3)
23A survey on piracy of digital products is available by Peitz and Waelbroeck (2006a) and Belleﬂamme and Peitz
(2010a).
24We use a similar approach comparable to Yoon (2002), Belleﬂamme (2003) and Bae and Choi (2006)
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If the consumer buys the original software, he obtains a utility θ − po where po
is the original software price charged by the software developers. If the consumer
gets a copy, he obtains a utility of θδ(1 − k), where δ (0, 1) measures the quality
degradation of an illegal copy. With this, if δ = 0 or k = 1, that is if the quality of
the copy is terrible or the software developer makes the product impossible to copy,
the utility that the consumer obtains from the copy is zero. It is further assumed
that the cost of investment is 25 c(k) < 1+δ(k−1)
4
, c(0) = 0 and when δ = 0 the cost
is c(k) = 0 because k = 0.
4.2.5. Timing
The timing of the game is as follows: in the ﬁrst stage, platforms simultaneously
choose the price charged to consumers {pA, pB} and the license fees for developers
{lA, lB}. In the second stage, consumers and software developers decide which plat-
form to join and in the third stage consumers decide whether to buy or get a copy.
We solve the model by backward induction and for four types of scenarios. We shall
begin with the case where consumers use a multi-homing strategy and developers
single-home, that is, consumers may buy from both platforms whereas each devel-
oper only buys or works with one of the two platforms. Then, we consider that
consumers and developers single-home. Then, the case of only developers multi-
homing is analyzed and ﬁnally we look into the case of both agents multi-homing.
Next, we solve the third stage of the game.
The indiﬀerent user between buying and copying is given by θ̂ = p
o
1−δ(1−k) and the
demand for the original product is Do = 1−p
o−δ(1−k)
1−δ(1−k) . The users from zero to θ̂ get
a copy and the users from θ̂ to one buy the original product.
Developer i´s proﬁt is given by
pidi = D
opoi − c(k)
25This condition guarantees that the developers obtain positive proﬁts in this market.
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The developers choose the proﬁt-maximizing price, which is equal to:
po∗ = 1
2
(1− δ(1− k))
The developers compensate a better quality copy with a lower price. Therefore a
reduction in the investment in an anti-piracy mechanism has a similar eﬀect to an
increase in the quality of the copy.
Each software developer earns proﬁts of pid = 1
4
(1− δ(1− k)− 4c(k)) per buyer;
these proﬁts correspond with the parameter v in (4.1).
User surplus for each software product is 1
8
(1 + 3δ(1− k)), which corresponds to
the network parameter governing the beneﬁt users get from each additional software
developer. User surplus is equalized to λ and developer surplus to v, which are the
variables that have an inﬂuence in the platforms market26
λ =
1
8
(1 + 3δ(1− k)) (4.4)
v =
1
4
(1− δ(1− k)− 4c(k)) (4.5)
To measure the level of piracy we make use of the quality of the copy and the
investment in the anti-piracy mechanism, δ and k. A high level of piracy will involve
an increase in δ and a decrease in k. A low level of piracy will be related with a
decrease in δ and an increase in k.
In this setting, the consumers additional valuation of each developer (λ) always
increases with more piracy and the developers additional valuation of each consumer
(v) increases when c > 1
4
(1 + δ − k) and decreases when c < 1
4
(1 + δ − k).
The following assumption is required to guarantee an interior solution.
A.0. tc > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
AssumptionA.0. tells us that the network eﬀects must not be too large compared
26The details of the calculation is relegated to the appendix.
101
with the horizontal diﬀerentiation parameter. It is assumed that A.0. holds in the
remainder of the chapter.
See Appendix.
4.3. Platforms decision
In this section we solve the second and ﬁrst stages of the game: the platforms,
the consumers and the developers choice. Platforms decide simultaneously the price
charged to consumers and the license fee charged to software developers for each
type of market. For the sake of the presentation, the main text presents the above
referred to as ﬁrst scenario27. Finally, we examine the utility that developers obtain
in each scenario.
4.3.1. Scenario 1: Consumers Multi-homing and Developers Single-
homing
In this subsection we assume that the consumers side of the market is
multi-homing while the developers side is single-homing. Consumers can buy from
both platforms at the same time but developers only work with one of the
platforms. For example, some consumers may buy a mobile with Android and a
mobile with iOS, others users only buy a mobile with Android or with iOS. In this
case, the application developers only make them for one mobile operating system.
When we consider that the consumers can follow a multi-homing strategy we ﬁnd
three types of consumers. From zero to xA the consumers only buy from platform
A, from xA to xB consumers buy from both platforms and from xB to one
27The results before the piracy stage are similar to Belleﬂame and Peitz (2010b), except when we consider whole
market multi-homing.
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consumers only buy from platform B. We assume that 0 < xA < xB < 1and report
the necessary condition for this ordering below. In this case xA corresponds with
the share of users that only buy from platform A and 1− xB corresponds with the
share of users that only buy from platform B. Therefore, xB − xA corresponds with
the share of users that buy from both platforms. Note that with consumers
multi-homing the total user demand for platforms is greater than 1.
The indirect utility of a consumer x subscribing to a platform is given by
U(x) =

V − tpxA − pA + nAλ if buy platform A
V − tp(1− xB)− pB + nBλ if buy platform B
2V + λ− pA − pB − tp if buy both platforms
(4.6)
Fulﬁlled expectations for both sides of the market implies that uA = xB,
uB = (1− xA) and nA = ẑ, nB = (1− ẑ).
Taking into account these relationships, the location of the indiﬀerent developer
between joining platform A or platform B is given by
ẑ =
lB − lA + tc + v(xA + xB − 1)
2tc
(4.7)
A group of developers goes to platform A and the other group goes to platform
B, developers are single-home.
To obtain the indiﬀerent consumer, we ﬁrst need to know the location of the
indiﬀerent consumer between joining platform A or both platforms and secondly the
location of the indiﬀerent consumer between joining platform B or both platforms.
The indiﬀerent consumers (xA and xB) and the multi-homing consumers (xB − xA)
are given by
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xA =
λ(ẑ − 1) + pB + tp − V
tp
(4.8)
xB =
V + λẑ − pA
tp
(4.9)
(xB − xA) = λ+ 2V − pA − pB − t
p
tp
(4.10)
The number of developers does not aﬀect the multi-homing consumers because
they can purchase and use the two types of software. The eﬀect of the externality
disappears for these users.
The multi-homing users base their decision taking into account the price of both
platforms. An increase in platform A (B) price produces a reduction of 1
tp
in the
number of multi-homing consumers and an increase in platform B (A) user by the
same amount.
Taking these equations into account, we solve for xA, xB and ẑ simultaneously. We
solve the system of three equations to express the indiﬀerent developer and the
indiﬀerent consumers in terms of prices and license fees28. The indiﬀerent
consumers are given by
xA =
λ2v + 2tctp(pB + t
p − V )− λ(v(pA + pB) + tp(lA − lB + tc + 2v)− 2vV )
2(tctp − λv)
(4.11)
xB =
λ2v + λ((lB − lA + tc)tp + v(pA + pB − 2V )) + 2tctp(V − pA)
2(tctp − λv) (4.12)
And the indiﬀerent developer is given by
28The detailed calculations are given in the appendix.
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ẑ =
tp(tc + lB − lA) + v(pB − pA − λ)
2(tctp − λv) (4.13)
Therefore, we derive total demand for either side of the market. The consumers
demand, denoted by DcCMA = xB, D
c
CMB = (1− xA) and the developers demand,
denoted by DdCMA = ẑ, D
d
CMB = (1− ẑ) are given by
DcCMi(pi, pj , li, lj) =
λ(tp(lj − li + tc) + v(pj + pi − 2V )) + 2tctp(V − pi)− λ2v
2(tctp − λv) , i, j = A,B, i 6= j (4.14)
DdSHi(pi, pj , li, lj) =
tp(tc + lj − li)− v(pi − pj + λ)
2(tctp − λv) , i, j = A,B, i 6= j (4.15)
Platforms choose prices and license fees so as to maximize their total revenues
piCMA = D
c
CMA(pA, pB, lA, lB)pA +D
d
CMA(pA, pB, lA, lB)lA
piCMB = D
c
CMB(pA, pB, lA, lB)pB +D
d
CMB(pA, pB, lA, lB)lB
The symmetric Nash equilibrium price for users and the symmetric Nash
equilibrium license fee for developers are
p∗CM =
1
2
V +
1
4
(λ− v) (4.16)
l∗CM = t
c − λ(λ+ 3v + 2V )
4tp
(4.17)
On the developers side, the platforms will charge the standard Hotelling 29 license
fee less a term that depends on the strength of the network externality, if λ = 0 the
license fee will be l∗CM = t
c.
29The standard Hotelling license fee is the same that the price when we are in the standard hotelling model with
zero cost: l∗ = tc
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The equilibrium platforms proﬁts are
pi∗CM =
1
2
tc +
V 2
4tp
− 1
16tp
(λ2 + v2 + 6λv) (4.18)
The platform proﬁt is negatively inﬂuenced by the two type of externalities.
4.3.1.1. Piracy
Next, we analyze the eﬀect of piracy on the equilibrium variables. We know from
the analysis of the third stage that 30 λ = 1
8
(1+3δ(1−k)), v = 1
4
(1−δ(1−k)−4c(k))
and the ﬁnal values of (p∗CM , l
∗
CM , pi
∗
CM) with the possibility of piracy are as follows
p∗CM =
1
2
V +
1
4
c(k) +
1
32
(5δ(1− k)− 1) (4.19)
l∗CM = t
c − (1 + 3δ(1− k))(7− 24c(k) + 16V − 3δ(1− k))
256tp
(4.20)
pi∗CM =
1
2
tc+
1
4tp
V 2− 1
16tp
c(k)2+
1
64tp
c(k)(5+7δ(1−k))− 1
1024tp
(δ(1−k)(22−23δ(1−k))+17)
(4.21)
On the developers side, the platforms charge the Hotelling standard license fee
less a term that is always positive. With more piracy, the latter term increases and
produces a reduction in the license fee. The platforms charge a lower license fee to
attract the largest number of software developers, also the consumer valuation of
additional software increases with more piracy.
On the consumer side, when c < 5
8
(1− k + δ) the platform increases the price and
when c > 5
8
(1− k + δ) it decreases the price.
30From section 4.2.5.
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Now, the platform proﬁts can either increase or decrease with more piracy. We
observe separately the revenue that the platforms obtain from developers (pipd) and
the revenue from consumers (pipc). If c < 1
8
(1−k+δ) the platform proﬁt can increase
or decrease with more piracy; under this condition pipc always increases with more
piracy, but pipd always decreases with more piracy. There are two possible cases; if
4pipc > ∇pipd, the platform proﬁt increases with more piracy and if 4pipc < ∇pipd,
the proﬁt decreases with more piracy.
When 1
8
(1 − k + δ) < c < 1
4
(1 − k + δ), we always have that 4pipc < ∇pipd, the
reduction in revenue from developers is greater than the increase in the revenue from
consumers. The platform proﬁt decreases with more piracy.
Finally, if c > 1
4
(1−k+ δ), the platform proﬁt always decreases with more piracy
because, either we have that 4pipc < ∇pipd or that the two revenues decrease with
more piracy.
In the following ﬁgure we have all the eﬀects
Figure 4.1: The eﬀect of an increase in piracy when consumers use a multi-
homing strategy.
Proposition 1. If c < 5
8
(1 − k + δ), the price increases with more piracy and
if c > 5
8
(1 − k + δ), the price decreases with more piracy. If c > 1
8
(1 − k + δ), the
platform proﬁt decreases with more piracy and if c < 1
8
(1−k+δ), the platform proﬁt
can either increase or decrease with more piracy. The license fee always decreases
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with more piracy.
Now, we analyze the eﬀect of piracy on the share of consumers
At equilibrium n∗A = n
∗
B = 1/2 and uA and uB are given by
u∗A = u
∗
B =
3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k)
32tp
(4.22)
And the number of multi-homing consumers
(xB − xA) = 3− 8c(k)− 16t
p + 16V + δ(1− k)
16tp
(4.23)
The number of consumers multi-homing is higher with more piracy despite the
fact that it can produce an increase in platform price.
The number of single-homing users is given by
xA = 1− xB = 8c(k)− 3 + 32t
p − 16V − δ(1− k)
32tp
(4.24)
The ﬁnal demand of each platform when consumers can be multi-homing is the
same. The number of single-homing consumers decreases with more piracy.
On the one hand, an increase in the quality of the copy produces an increment in
the number of multi-homing consumers in 1−k
16tp
. On the other hand, a decrease in
the investment produces an increment in the number of multi-homing consumers
in δ
16tp
. Logically, the eﬀect on the number of single-homing consumers is the
opposite, before an increase in the quality of the copy the number of single-homing
consumers decreases in 1−k
16tp
and were there an increase in the investment in an
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anti-piracy mechanism the number of single-homing consumers would increase in
δ
16tp
in each platform.
The following assumption is required for the consistency of the above argument
with 0 < xA < xB < 1.
A.1. 1
32
(3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k)) < tp < 1
16
(3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k))
See Appendix.
4.3.2. Scenario 2: Platforms Decisions with Single-homing
In this subsection we assume a market where users only buy from one of the
platforms and the developers only work with one of the platforms. To illustrate,
users would decide whether to buy a Mac or a PC and the developers only develop
software for one of the two systems. Consumers also decide if they want to purchase
the original software for a particular platform or prefer, if possible, to get an illegal
copy.
Both sides of the market are single-homing. In this setting, fulﬁlled expectations
on the consumers side imply that nA = ẑ and nB = (1− ẑ) , and on the developers
side uA = x̂ and uB = (1 − x̂). In equilibrium the consumers and the software
developers expectations about the number of users and the number of developers in
each platform are equal to the platforms market share on both sides.
Now, we analyze the eﬀects of piracy in a single-homing market. To do it, we
study what happens when the quality of the copy increases and when the investment
in an anti-piracy mechanism decrease.
We know from the analysis of the third stage that λ = 1
8
(1 + 3δ(1− k)) and
v = 1
4
(1− δ(1− k)− 4c(k)), therefore the ﬁnal values of (p∗SH , l∗SH , pi∗SH) are as
follows
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p∗SH = t
p + c(k) +
1
4
(δ(1− k)− 1) (4.25)
l∗SH = t
c − 3
8
δ(1− k)− 1
8
(4.26)
With more piracy the platforms reduce the license fee. An increase in piracy pro-
duces an increment 3
8
(1 + δ − k) in the consumer valuation of additional software.
If the platforms reduce the license fee they will attract more developers and con-
sequently more consumers. The developers have lost sales from the market where
they sell the software, but that fall is compensated by a reduction in the license fee.
If c > 1
4
(1− k + δ) more piracy leads platforms to reduce the price because this
level of marginal cost produces an increment in the developers additional valuation
of each consumer (v) 1
4
(k − 1 − δ) + c > 0. Platforms can attract more developers
if, ﬁrst, they attract more consumers.
In contrast, if c < 1
4
(1 − k + δ), such additional valuation decreases with more
piracy , with more consumers the platforms will attract less developers, and they
compensate this eﬀect with higher prices.
At equilibrium u∗A = u
∗
B = 1/2 and n
∗
A = n
∗
B = 1/2, the two platforms share the
market equally and make the following proﬁt
pi∗SH =
1
2
(tc + tp)− 1
2
c(k)− 1
16
(16δ(1− k) + 3) (4.27)
Is easy to observe from the proﬁt function that more piracy produces a reduction
in platform proﬁts. Although we consider the case where c > 1
4
(1 − k + δ), the
reduction in the license fee is so strong that in spite of the increase in price the
ﬁnal eﬀect is a proﬁt reduction. The decrease in the license fee produces a loss of
3
16
(1+δ−k) in the platform proﬁt and the increase in the price a gain in 1
8
(1+δ−k)−c,
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the other term always exceeds the latter.
Proposition 2. If c < 1
4
(1 − k + δ), the price increases with more piracy and
if c > 1
4
(1 − k + δ), the price decreases with more piracy. The license fee and the
platform proﬁts always decrease with more piracy.
4.3.3. Scenario 3: Platforms Decisions with Developers Multi-homing
and consumers Single-homing
In this subsection we assume that the consumers side of the market is
single-homing and the developers side is multi-homing. Developers can work with
both platforms at the same time but consumers only buy from one of the two
platforms. This is a rather common case as shown in the following example.
Consider the console market with PlayStation and Xbox, the most common habit
is that each user buys one of the two consoles. On the developers side we ﬁnd a
large variety of game developers that develop games for both consoles, for example
Electronic Arts, Ubisoft Entertainment, Konami Corporation or Square Enix, to
mention a few. Besides we ﬁnd game developers that only work with one of the
video consoles, for example Novarama, Bungie Studios, Game Freak, Insomniac
Games...
When we consider that the developers employ a multi-homing strategy we ﬁnd
three types of developers. From zero to zA the developers only work with platform
A, from zA to zB developers work with both platforms and from zB to one
developers only work with platform B. We assume that 0 < zA < zB < 1, and
report the necessary condition below.
We know from the analysis of the third stage that λ = 1
8
(1 + 3δ(1− k)) and
v = 1
4
(1− δ(1− k)− 4c(k)), the ﬁnal values of (p∗DM , l∗DM , pi∗DM) :
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p∗DM = t
p − (4c(k) + δ(1− k)− 1)(8c(k)− 5− 16β − 7δ(1− k))
128tc
(4.28)
l∗DM =
1
2
β − 1
4
c(k)− 1
32
(5δ(1− k)− 1) (4.29)
pi∗DM =
1
2
tp+
1
4tc
β2− 1
16tc
c(k)2+
1
64tc
c(k)(5+7δ(1−k))− 1
1024tc
(δ(1−k)(22− 23δ(1−k))+17)
(4.30)
Now, platform proﬁts can either increase or decrease with more piracy. We
observe separately the revenue that the platforms obtain from developers (pipd) and
the revenue from consumers (pipc). In this case the diﬀerence with the previous
section is that the license fee can increase or decrease with more piracy.
When c < 1
8
(1−k+δ) the platform proﬁt increases or decreases with more piracy,
there are three possible cases; ﬁrst, if 4pipc > ∇pipd the platform proﬁt increases,
second, if 4pipc < ∇pipd the platform proﬁt decreases and the last one, when both
revenues decrease and logically platform proﬁt decreases.
If 1
8
(1−k+ δ) < c < 1
4
(1−k+ δ), the platform proﬁt always decreases with more
piracy because the two possibilities that we have are 4pipc < ∇pipd or that both
revenues decrease.
Finally, if we consider that c > 1
4
(1− k + δ), we have that 4pipc < ∇pipd or that
both revenues decrease.
In the following ﬁgure we have all the eﬀects
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Figure 4.2: The eﬀect of an increase in piracy when developers use a multi-
homing strategy.
Proposition 3. If c > 5
8
(1 − k + δ), the license fee increases with more piracy
and if c < 5
8
(1−k+δ), the license fee decreases with more piracy. If c > 1
4
(1−k+δ),
the price decreases with more piracy and if c < 1
4
(1− k + δ), the price can increase
or decrease with more piracy. If c > 1
8
(1− k + δ), the platform proﬁt decreases with
more piracy and if c < 1
8
(1−k+δ), the platform proﬁt can increase or decrease with
more piracy.
We know that at equilibrium u∗A = u
∗
B = 1/2 and n
∗
A and n
∗
B at equilibrium are:
n∗A = n
∗
B =
3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k)
32tc
(4.31)
The number of single-homing developers is given by:
zA = (1− zB) = 8c(k)− 3 + 32t
c − 16β − δ(1− k)
32tc
(4.32)
And the number of multi-homing developers:
(zB − zA) = 3− 8c(k)− 16t
c + 16β + δ(1− k)
16tc
(4.33)
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The following assumption is required for the consistency of the above argument
with 0 < zA < zB < 1.
A.3. 1
32
(3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k)) < tc < 1
16
(3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k))
See Appendix.
4.3.4. Scenario 4: Platforms Decision with Multi-homing
In this subsection we consider that consumers and developers are multi-homing.
We ﬁnd three types of consumers , from zero to xA the set of consumers that only
buy from platform A, from xA to xB those that buy from both platforms and from
xB to one the set of consumers who only buy from platform B. And we assume
that all developers are multi-homing. In this setting, we must have that
0 < xA < xB < 1 and zA = 0 and zB = 1; we express the speciﬁc condition for this
below.
We know from the analysis of the third stage that λ = 1
8
(1 + 3δ(1− k)) and
v = 1
4
(1− δ(1− k)− 4c(k)), the ﬁnal values of (p∗M , l∗M , pi∗M) :
p∗M =
1
2
V +
1
2
c(k) +
1
16
(5δ(1− k)− 1) (4.34)
l∗M =
1
4tp
c(k)2+
1
2
β+
V
32tp
− 1
8tp
c(k)(1+2V −δ(1−k))− 1
128tp
δ(1−k)(7+20V )− 1
256tp
((5δ2(1−k)2)−3)
(4.35)
pi∗M =
1
2
β +
1
4tp
V (V − c(k)) + V
32tp
(δ(1− k) + 3) (4.36)
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In the following ﬁgure we have all the eﬀects
Figure 4.3: The eﬀect of an increase in piracy when the whole the market is
multi-homing.
Proposition 4. If c > 1
8
(5−5k+5δ), the price increases with more piracy and if
c < 1
8
(5−5k+5δ), the price decreases with more piracy. If c > (1+δ−k)(16c(k)−20V−5δ(1−k)−7)
16(4c(k)−2V+δ(1−k)−1) ,
the license fee increases with more piracy and if c < (1+δ−k)(16c(k)−20V−5δ(1−k)−7)
16(4c(k)−2V+δ(1−k)−1) the li-
cense fee decreases with more piracy. Platform proﬁts increase with more piracy.
We assume that n∗A = n
∗
B = 1 and u
∗
A and u
∗
B at equilibrium are:
u∗A = u
∗
B =
3− 8c(k) + 8V + δ(1− k)
16tp
(4.37)
The number of single-homing users is given by
xA = (1− xB) = 8c(k)− 3 + 16t
p − 8V − δ(1− k)
16tp
(4.38)
and the multi-homing one is
(xB − xA) = 3− 8ck − 8t
p + 8V + δ(1− k)
8tp
(4.39)
The following assumption31 is required for the consistency of the above argument
31The detailed calculation is available from the author
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with 0 < xA < xB < 1 and zA = 0 and zB = 1.
A.4. 1
32
(3− 8c(k) + 8V + δ(1− k)) < tp < 1
16
(3− 8c(k) + 8V + δ(1− k)) and
tc = 64c(k)
2+128tpβ+(3+(1−k)δ)2+8V (3+δ(1−k))−16c(k)(3+4V+δ(1−k))
256tp
4.3.5. Comparing the developer utility
Now, we calculate the developers utility in the four types of scenarios to establish
when developers do not want piracy and when they are not against.
The total utility32 of a developer in the four scenarios is divided into two parts,
the utility coming from consumers and the utility coming from platforms.
In scenario 1 the utility that the developers obtain from their sales to consumers
is given by 1
128tp
(8c(k) − 16V − δ(1 − k) − 3)(4c(k) + δ(1 − k) − 1) and the utility
from working with a platform is given by 1
2
(2β − 3tc) + 3
32tp
c(k)(1 + 3δ(1 − k)) +
1
256tp
(1 + 3δ(1− k))(7 + 16V − 3δ(1− k)). Total developer utility is given by
pidCM =
1
256tp
(1 + 9δ2(k − 1)2 + 6δ(1− k)(1 + 16v + 8V )) + 1
16tp
(V + 2v(1 + 2v +
4V ))− 1
4
(4c(k) + 6tc + δ(1− k)− 1)
From the consumers, the utility can increase or decrease with more piracy due
to the existence of consumer's multi-homing, in the single-homing case this utility
always decreases. From the platforms, the utility increases because the platforms
establish a lower license fee independently of the presence of consumer's multi-
homing.
When the market is single-homing, scenario 2, the utility that the developers
obtain is decomposed into 1
8
(1 − 4c(k) − δ(1 − k)) from sales to consumers and
1
8
(1− 12tc + 8β + 3δ(1− k)) from working with a platform. Total developer utility
is given by
32From now on we will use the notation pid
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pidSH =
1
8
(3− 8c(k)− 12tc + 4v + δ(1− k))
From the consumers, utility goes down with more piracy because developers
establish a lower price to compensate for the eﬀect of piracy. From the platforms,
utility increases because platforms establish a lower license fee.
In scenario 3, the utility derived from the consumers, if they are single-homing
is 1
8
(1 − 4c(k) − δ(1 − k)) and if they are multi-homing is 1
4
(1 − 4c(k) − δ(1 − k)).
And the utility derived from the platforms, if they are single-homing 1
16
(1− 16tc +
16β+3δ(1−k)) and if they are multi-homing 1
16
(8c(k)−1−16tc+16β+5δ(1−k)).
Total developer utility is given by
pidDM =
1
16
(3− 8c(k)− 16tc + 16β + δ(1− k)).
Now, since developers may be multi-homing we have two diﬀerent utilities, it
depends on whether the developers are single-homing or multi-homing . As we can
observe the multi-homing developers obtain the double of utility than the single-
homing from the direct sales to the consumers. But this eﬀect is compensated in
the utility that they obtain from the platforms and all the developers obtain the
same ﬁnal utility.
When all the market is multi-homing the utility that the developers obtain from
their direct sales to the consumers is given by 1
32tp
(8c(k)−8V −δ(1−k)−3)(4c(k)+
δ(1−k)−1) and the usefulness of working with a platform is given by 1
2
β+ 1
16tp
c(k)(7+
12V −3δ(1−k))+ 1
256tp
(3+δ(1−k))(9δ(1−k)−5)− 1
32tp
V (5−9δ(1−k))− 3
4tp
c(k)2.
The total developer utility is given by
pidM =
1
4tp
c(k)2+ 1
2
β− 1
16tp
c(k)(3+4V + δ(1−k))+ 1
32tp
V (3+ δ(1−k))+ 1
256tp
((1−
k)δ + 3)2
When whole the market is multi-homing, we have the same results in developers
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utility that in the ﬁrst and the second scenario.
Except when consumers can be multi-homing (in which case developer utility can
be greater or lesser). The developers always obtain a higher utility with more piracy.
If we are in a market with piracy, the developers obtain a higher utility with more
piracy.
4.3.6. Summary
We next summarize the eﬀect of piracy in the four scenarios earlier considered. Let
us ﬁrst look at the eﬀect of an increase in the quality of the copies, δ, and secondly
at the eﬀect of an increase in the anti-piracy mechanism, k.
Increases in δ
p∗ l∗ pi∗ pid∗
CosumersMulti− homing (+) (−) (+/−) (+/−)
Single− homing (+) (−) (−) (+)
DevelopersMulti− homing (+/−) (−) (+/−) (+)
Multi− homing (+) (−) (+) (+)
Increases in k
p∗ l∗ pi∗ pid∗
CosumersMulti− homing (+/−) (+) (+/−) (+/−)
Single− homing (+/−) (+) (+) (−)
DevelopersMulti− homing (+/−) (+/−) (+/−) (−)
Multi− homing (+/−) (+/−) (−) (−)
We observe that, when there is an increase the quality of the copy, the license fee
decreases in all cases. Developers obtain lower revenue from the sales to consumers
and platforms compensate this eﬀect with reductions in the license fee to attract the
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largest possible variety of developers. In contrast, the price almost always increases
because platforms compensate the reductions in the license fee with higher prices.
When the whole the market follows a multi-homing strategy platforms always obtain
a higher proﬁt, the eﬀect of the price increases is greater than the reduction in the
license fee.
4.4. Welfare Analysis
Now, we are interested in assessing the welfare eﬀects on piracy under the various
scenarios
4.4.1. Scenario 1: Consumers Multi-homing and Developers Single-
homing
The expressions for consumer surplus, CS, and developer surplus,DS, in
equilibrium are:
CS∗CM =
1
1024tp
(3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k))2 (4.40)
DS∗CM =
1
4tp
c(k)2+
3
16tp
V +
1
4
(4β−5tc)+ 1
128tp
δ(1−k)(7+8V )− 1
4tp
c(k)(1+2V +δ(1−k))+ 1
256tp
(13−11δ2(1−k)2)
(4.41)
Adding up platform proﬁts from the previous section, total welfare can be ex-
pressed as follows
W ∗CM =
3
16tp
c(k)2 − 1
4
(tc − 4β)− 3
64tp
c(k)(3 + 16V + δ(1− k) + 1
1024tp
3(3 + 16V + δ(1− k))2 (4.42)
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The next proposition provides some comparative statics results
Proposition 5. Consumer surplus and total welfare increase with more piracy. If
c > 1
16
(1−k+δ), developer surplus increases with more piracy and if c < 1
16
(1−k+δ),
developer surplus can increase or decrease with more piracy.
4.4.2. Scenario 2: Platforms Decision with Single-homing
The expressions for CS and DS in equilibrium are:
CS∗SH =
1
16
(5− 16c(k)− 20tp + 16V − δ(1− k)) (4.43)
DS∗SH =
1
4
(1− 5tc + 4β + δ(1− k)) (4.44)
Adding up platform proﬁts, total welfare can be expressed as
W ∗SH =
1
16
(3− 4tc − 4tp + 16V + 16β + δ(1− k)) (4.45)
The next proposition provides some comparative statics results
Proposition 6. If c > 1
16
(1−k+δ) consumer surplus increases with more piracy
and if c < 1
16
(1 − k + δ) consumer surplus decreases with more piracy. Developer
surplus and total welfare increase with more piracy.
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4.4.3. Scenario 3: Platforms Decision with Developers Multi-homing and
consumers Single-homing
The expressions for CS and DS in equilibrium are:
CS∗DM =
1
4tc
c(k)2+
3
16tc
β+
1
4
(4V −5tc)+ 1
128tc
δ(1−k)(7+8β)− 1
4tc
c(k)(1+2β+δ(1−k))+ 1
256tc
(13−11δ2(1−k)2)
(4.46)
DS∗DM =
1
1024tc
(3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k))2 (4.47)
Adding up platform proﬁts from the previous section, total welfare can be ex-
pressed as follows
W ∗DM = 2t
p− 1
64tc
(12c(k)2+c(k)(16β−17)−2β(3+40β))+ 1
512tc
δ(1−k)(216c(k)+16β−41)+ 1
1024tc
(93δ2(1−k)2−59)
(4.48)
The next proposition provides some comparative statics results
Proposition 7. If c > 1
16
(1 − k + δ), consumer surplus increases with more
piracy and if c < 1
16
(1−k+δ), consumer surplus can increase or decrease with more
piracy. Developer surplus increases with more piracy. Total welfare can increase or
decrease with more piracy.
4.4.4. Scenario 4: Platforms Decision with Multi-homing
The expressions for CS and DS in equilibrium are:
CS∗M =
1
256tp
(3− 8c(k) + 8V + δ(1− k)2 (4.49)
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DS∗M =
1
2
β+
1
4tp
c(k)2+
1
256tp
(3+ δ(1−k))2+ 1
32tp
V (3+ δ(1−k))− 1
16tp
c(k)(3+4V + δ(1−k)) (4.50)
Adding up platform proﬁts from the previous section, total welfare can be ex-
pressed as follows
W ∗M =
1
4tp
c(k)2+
V 2
tp
+
5
2
β+
1
256tp
(3+δ(1−k))2+ 5
32tp
V (3+δ(1−k))− 1
16tp
c(k)(3+20V +δ(1−k)) (4.51)
The next proposition provides some comparative statics results
Proposition 8. Consumer surplus, developer surplus and total welfare increase
with more piracy.
The main result that we observe is that total welfare increases with more piracy,
except when developers are multi-homing; in this case the eﬀect is ambiguous. The
increase in developer and consumer surplus compensate the possible eﬀect of the
reduction in platform proﬁts.
We summarize the main eﬀects in the following table when the quality of the
copy increases and when the investment in an anti-piracy mechanism increases:
CS∗ DS∗ pi∗ W ∗
ConsumersMulti− homing (+) + (+/−) + (+/−) ⇒ (+)
Single− homing (+/−) + (+) + (−) ⇒ (+)
DevelopersMulti− homing (+/−) + (+) + (+/−) ⇒ (+/−)
Multi− homing (+) + (+) + (+) ⇒ (+)
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4.5. What can a social planner do to improve welfare?
Now consider the case where a social planner can mediate with the piracy problem.
To do it, the authority will regulate the developers market. We focus our attention
on the market where software developers and consumers interact.
The social planner will choose the software prices that maximize total welfare
deﬁned by the sum of consumer and developer surplus.
Thus, consumer surplus is given by CS =
∫ θ
0
θδ(1 − k)dθ + ∫ 1
θ
θ − podθ and
developer surplus by DS = (1 − θ̂)po − c(k). We may then write total welfare in
this market as W = 1
2
− po2
2−2δ(1−k) − c(k). The social planner chooses the ﬁnal price
that maximizes W with piracy. We obtain that p∗ow = 0, that is, the social planner
establishes a price that blocks piracy because the cost of the original software is the
same as that of the illegal version. All consumers buy the software and the demand
for the original software is Do = 1.
Now, with this regulation consumer surplus for each software product is 1
2
and
developer surplus is −c(k) but developers need not invest in any anti-piracy mech-
anism, therefore developer surplus is zero because c(0) = 0. In conclusion, we have:
λ = 1
2
and v = 0.
Next, we proceed to examine all scenarios when the social planner regulates the
software market for λ = 1
2
and v = 0. The ﬁnal values of (p˜∗, l˜∗, pi∗)33 in the four
types of scenarios.
4.5.1. Scenario 1: Consumers Multi-homing and Developers Single-
homing
Platforms establish the proﬁt maximizing price and license fee as follows
p˜∗CM =
1
8
(1 + 4V − 2v) (4.52)
33We use an upper bar to identify a variable in the social optimum setting.
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l˜∗CM =
16tctp − 6v − 4V − 1
16tp
(4.53)
Both platforms make the following proﬁt
pi∗CM =
32tctp − 4v(3 + v) + 16V 2 − 1
64tp
(4.54)
The number of single-homing consumers and the multi-homing consumers is given
by
x˜a = (1− x˜b) = 8t
p − 2v − 4V − 1
8tp
(4.55)
(x˜b − x˜a) = 1− 4t
p + 2v + 4V
4tp
(4.56)
And total welfare is equal to
W˜ ∗CM =
3(1 + 2v + 4V )2 − 16tctp
64tp
(4.57)
We can now compare the results with regulation and without regulation
The price p∗CM − p˜∗CM < 0
The license fee l∗CM − l˜∗CM Q 0
The platforms proﬁt pi∗CM − pi∗CM Q 0
The welfare W ∗CM − W˜ ∗CM < 0
The number of multi-homing users is higher with the social planner regulation.
Regulation results in a welfare improvement. If a social planner regulates the
consumers and developers market then the price paid by consumers and platforms
proﬁt are higher, whereas the license fee paid by developers is lower.
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4.5.2. Scenario 2: Consumers and Developers Single-homing
Platforms establish the proﬁt maximizing price and license fee as follows
p˜∗SH = t
p − v (4.58)
l˜∗SH = t
c − 1
2
(4.59)
Both platforms make the following proﬁt
pi∗SH =
1
4
(2(tc + tp − v)− 1) (4.60)
Total welfare with single-homing and regulation is given by
W˜ ∗SH =
1
4
(1− tc − tp + 2v) + V (4.61)
We can now compare the results with regulation and without regulation
The price p∗SH − p˜∗SH < 0
The license fee l∗SH − l˜∗SH > 0
The platforms proﬁt pi∗SH − pi∗SH > 0
The welfare W ∗SH − W˜ ∗SH < 0
4.5.3. Scenario 3: Developers Multi-homing and Consumers Single-
homing
Platforms establish the proﬁt maximizing price and license fee as follows
p˜∗DM =
8tctp − v(3 + 2v)
8tc
(4.62)
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l˜∗DM =
1
8
(2v − 1) (4.63)
Both platforms make the following proﬁt
pi∗DM =
32tctp − 4v(3 + v) + 16V 2 − 1
64tc
(4.64)
The number of single-homing and multi-homing developers is given by
z˜a = (1− z˜b) = 8tc− 2v − 1
8tc
(4.65)
(z˜b − z˜a) = 1− 4t
c + 2v
4tc
(4.66)
Total welfare is equal to
W˜ ∗CM =
128tctp − 4v(11 + 3v)− 3
64tc
(4.67)
We can now compare the results with regulation and without regulation
The price p∗DM − p˜∗DM Q 0
The license fee l∗DM − l˜∗DM > 0
The platforms proﬁt pi∗DM − pi∗DM Q 0
The welfare W ∗DM − W˜ ∗DM Q 0
The number of multi-homing developers is higher without the social planner
regulation.
We now ﬁnd that regulation results in a welfare decrease. A social planner that
regulates the consumers and developers market produces an increase in the license
fee paid by developers; the eﬀect on prices and platform proﬁts is ambiguous.
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4.5.4. Scenario 4: Platforms Decision with Multi-homing
Platforms establish the proﬁt maximizing price and license fee as follows
p˜∗M =
1
4
(1 + 2V ) (4.68)
l˜∗M =
8tpβ − 2V − 1
16tp
(4.69)
Both platforms make the following proﬁt
pi∗M =
V + 2V 2 + 4tpβ
8tp
(4.70)
The number of multi-homing consumers is given by34
x˜a = (1− x˜b) = 4t
p + 2V − 1
4tp
(4.71)
(x˜b − x˜a) = 1− 2t
p + 2V
2tp
(4.72)
Total welfare is equal to
W˜ ∗M =
1− 8tctp + 6V + 8V 2 + 24tpβ
8tp
(4.73)
We can now compare the results with regulation and without regulation
The price p∗M − p˜∗M < 0
The license fee l∗M − l˜∗M R 0
The platforms proﬁt pi∗M − pi∗M < 0
The total welfare W ∗M − W˜ ∗M R 0
34Recall that all the developers are multi-homing z˜A = 0 and z˜B = 1.
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4.5.5. Comparing developer proﬁts with and without regulation
A social planner that regulates the market makes piracy disappear. In this sub-
section we analyze developer proﬁts with and without piracy to conclude that the
developers are usually better oﬀ without piracy but, when it exists, their proﬁts are
higher with more piracy.
When we consider a market where consumers can be multi-homing the eﬀect on
developer proﬁts is ambiguous. With regulation proﬁts are pidCM = β − 3t
c
2
+ 1+4V
16tp
.
This proﬁt level can be higher or lower than without regulation depending on certain
conditions.
With a single-homing market without regulation developer proﬁts can be seen in
section 4.3.5. When a social planner regulates the market these proﬁts are pidSH =
β+ 1
2
− 3tc
2
. With a simple subtraction we obtain pidSH−pidSH = 14(δ(1−k)−1−2c(k))
that is always negative; this means that software developers obtain a higher proﬁt
without piracy in the market.
Another case is when developers can be multi-homing. In this setting developer
proﬁts with regulation are pidDM = β +
1
4
− tc and without regulation are given in
section 4.3.5.. The diﬀerence between proﬁts pidDM − pidDM = 116(δ(1 − k) − 1 −
8c(k)), this diﬀerence is always negative. As in the single-homing case, the software
developers obtain a higher proﬁt without piracy.
The last case is when all the market is multi-homing. Developer proﬁts when a
social planner regulates is given by pidM =
1+2V+8tpβ
16tp
. It can be checked that developer
proﬁts is always higher with regulation.
The developers always obtain a higher utility with more piracy, but if a social
planner regulates the market (making piracy disappear), the developers always ob-
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tain a higher utility without piracy35. If software developers cannot prevent piracy
completely, they should invest in improving their products and attempt to exploit
the potential advantages of piracy rather than investing in anti-piracy mechanisms
(if you cannot beat them, join them). In this regard, we can ﬁnd developers who
confess that piracy may be good (except when consumers can be multi-homing. The
developers always obtain a higher utility with more piracy) and other developers
who want to prevent it completely ( if piracy disappears, developers always obtain
a higher utility). Software developers obtain higher utilities without piracy, but like
or not, we live in a world with piracy and, with this, they obtain a higher utility
with more piracy.
4.6. Conclusion
This chapter has studied the impact of software piracy in a two-sided market, in
particular, its eﬀect on the platforms and proﬁt behaviour since platforms compete
to attract consumers and software developers.
In our approach piracy appears in the market where consumers and developers
interact; consumers can buy the original software or can get an illegal copy. Fur-
thermore, the software developers have the possibility to invest in an anti-piracy
mechanism. We wish to establish whether developers win or lose with piracy.
To this end we have developed a model with platforms, software developers and
consumers. On the one hand, consumers and developers decide which platform to
join in four diﬀerent scenarios. On the other hand, consumers decide whether to
buy the original software or obtain an illegal version, taking into account the quality
of the copy and if the developers invest to avoid piracy.
There appear externalities that transmit across markets. This means that what-
ever may happen on one side of the market will eventually aﬀect the other side.
35Except when consumers can be multi-homing because proﬁt can be higher or lower than without regulation
depending on certain conditions
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Consumers want to purchase from the platform with a large variety of software de-
velopers and software developers want to develop software for the platform with a
larger user base.
Our results support what we actually observe in these markets. Many developers
are positioned against piracy, but there is a range of developers that are not against.
We also identify a conﬂict between platforms and software developers in the anti-
piracy strategies because we have found cases where developers gain with more
piracy, but platforms lose proﬁts.
When consumers use a multi-homing strategy and software developers a single-
homing strategy, developers may gain or lose with more piracy.
In the second scenario, software developers obtain a higher utility with more
piracy despite it aﬀecting negatively the sales from original software; such a negative
eﬀect is compensated by a lower license fee. Platforms obtain lower proﬁt with more
piracy because they reduce the license fee to try and attract the largest number of
developers.
In third scenario, the results are more ambiguous. When the developers side can
be multi-homing we ﬁnd conditions under which platforms might not be against
piracy. Software developers gain with more piracy.
In the last scenario is the only one scenario where software developers and plat-
forms gain with more piracy.
Finally, we have analyzed total welfare and we have calculated the social optimum
to explore the role of a social planner with the piracy problem.
Total welfare increases with more piracy, except when developers are multi-
homing; in this case the eﬀect is ambiguous. The increase in developer and consumer
surplus compensate the possible eﬀect of the reduction in platform proﬁts. When de-
velopers follow a multi-homing strategy the eﬀect of piracy in total welfare depends
on the marginal cost of the investment in anti-piracy, total welfare can increase
or decrease with more piracy. A social planner should intervene when consumers
use a multi-homing strategy and developers a single-homing strategy, and when the
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market is single-homing, in the last two scenarios depend on several conditions.
Finally, the developers always obtain a higher utility with more piracy, but if
a social planner regulates the market (making piracy disappear), the developers
always obtain a higher utility without piracy.
4.7. Appendix
4.7.1 Proof of user surplus and the developer surplus
Consumer surplus in the software market is given by
CS =
∫ θ̂
0
θδ(1− k)dθ +
∫ 1
θ̂
θ − podθ = 1
2
(θ̂(1− θ̂) + δ(1− k)(1− θ̂(1− θ̂))
We know that in equilibrium θ̂ = 1
2
and then consumer surplus becomes
CS =
1
8
(1 + 3δ(1− k)) = λ
Such consumer surplus level corresponds with the parameter λ, the network pa-
rameter governing the beneﬁt users get from each additional software developer.
Developer surplus is given by the developers proﬁts in this market
pid =
1
4
(1− 4c(k)− δ(1− k)) > 0
where the parameter c(k) < 1+δ(k−1)
4
guarantees that the developers obtain a
positive proﬁt in the market; if we assumed that c(k) > 1+δ(k−1)
4
no developer would
invest in the anti-piracy mechanism because pid = 1
4
(1 − 4c(k) − δ(1 − k)) < 0 and
the investment would be zero.
4.7.2 Proof of Assumption 0
Assumption A.0 follows from the second order condition for proﬁt maximization. We
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calculate the second order condition in the four types of scenarios. We obtain more
than one condition but the stronger condition is given bytp > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
.
4.7.2.1. When consumers side can be multi-homing
The second order condition for the consumer side is given by
∂2pii
∂p2i
=
8tc
v(1 + 3δ(1− k))8− tctp −
1
tp
We must have that ∂
2pii
∂p2i
< 0, this condition is only satisﬁed if 1
tp
> 8tc
v(1+3δ(1−k))8−tctp
and this happen when tp > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
and when 0 < tp < v(1+3δ(1−k))
16tc
.
The second order condition for the developer side is given by
∂2pii
∂l2i
=
8tc
v(1 + 3δ(1− k))8− tctp
We must have that ∂
2pii
∂l2i
< 0, this condition is met if tctp > v(1 + 3δ(1− k))8 and
this happen when tp > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
.
4.7.2.2. When both sides of the market are single-homing
The second order condition for the consumer side is given by
∂2pii
∂p2i
=
2tp
1
4
v(1 + 3δ(1− k))− 2tctp
We must have that ∂
2pii
∂p2i
< 0, this condition is only satisﬁed if 2tctp > 1
4
v(1 +
3δ(1− k)) and this happen when tp > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
.
The second order condition for the developer side is the same, consequently the
condition is the same.
4.7.2.3. When developers side can be multi-homing
The second order condition for the consumers side is given by
∂2pii
∂p2i
=
8tc
v(1 + 3δ(1− k))8− tctp
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We must have that ∂
2pii
∂p2i
< 0, this condition is only met if tctp > v(1+3δ(1− k))8
and this happen when tp > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
.
The second order condition for the developer side is given by
∂2pii
∂l2i
=
8tc
v(1 + 3δ(1− k))8− tctp −
1
tp
We must have that ∂
2pii
∂l2i
< 0, this condition is only met if 1
tp
> 8tc
v(1+3δ(1−k))8−tctp
and this happen when tp > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
and when 0 < tp < v(1+3δ(1−k))
16tc
.
The only condition that is satisﬁed in the four cases and in both sides of the
market is tp > (1+3δ(1−k))(1−4c(k)−δ(1−k))
32tp
, therefore we impose this condition which
guarantees that the second order conditions will be fulﬁlled.
4.7.3. Proof of consumers multi-homing
We consider the possibility of consumers multi-homing, we calculate the indirect
utility of a consumer x̂ who buys platform A or platform B or both platforms.
A consumer who is indiﬀerent between buy platform A or buy both platforms is
given by U(x)A = U(x)A+U(x)B, V − tpxA− pA+ ẑλ = 2V +λ− pA− pB − tp. We
solve xA, and we obtain xA =
λ(ẑ−1)+pb+tp−V
tp
.
A consumer who is indiﬀerent between buy platform B or buy both platforms is
given by UB = UA + UB, V − tp(1− xB)− pB + (1− ẑ)λ = 2V + λ− pA − pB − tp.
We solve xB, and we obtain xB =
λẑ+V−pA
tp
.
The indiﬀerent developer is β − lA − tcz + xBv = β − lB − tc(1− z) + (1− xA)v, we
solve for ẑ and obtain the indiﬀerent developer ẑ = lB−lA+t
c+v(xA+xB−1)
2tc
. As we
know the values of xA and xB, substituting these values into the equation we have
ẑ =
lB − lA + tc + v((λ(ẑ−1)+pB+tp−Vtp ) + (λẑ+V−pAtp )− 1)
2tc
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We solve for ẑ and we have the indiﬀerent developer
ẑ =
tp(tc + lB − lA)− v(λ+ pA − pB)
2(tctp − λv)
We can solve the indiﬀerent consumers by substituting the value of ẑ and we obtain
xA =
λ(ẑ − 1) + pB + tp − V
tp
=
λ( t
p(tc+lB−lA)−v(λ+pA−pB)
2(tctp−λv) − 1) + pB + tp − V
tp
=
=
λ2v + 2tctp(pB + t
p − V )− λ(v(pA + pB) + tp(lA − lB + tc + 2v)− 2vV )
2(tctp − λv)
xB =
λẑ + V − pa
tp
=
λ t
p(tc+lB−lA)−v(λ+pA−pB)
2(tctp−λv) + V − pA
tp
=
=
λ2v + λ((lB − lA + tc)tp + v(pA + pB − 2V )) + 2tctp(V − pA)
2(tctp − λv)
4.7.4. Proof of Assumption 1
To be consistent with consumer side multi-homing we need 0 < xA < xB < 1, with
the ﬁnal values in equilibrium we can rewrite this condition as
0 <
8c(k)− 3 + 32tp − 16V − δ(1− k)
32tp
<
3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k)
32tp
< 1
We focus ﬁrst on the left hand of the inequalities. Rearranging terms we obtain
0 < (xB − xA):
0 <
3− 8c(k)− 16tp + 16V + δ(1− k)
16tp
0 < 3− 8c(k)− 16tp + 16V + δ(1− k)
16tp < 3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k)
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tp <
1
16
(3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k))
Now, we focus on the right hand side to obtain (xB − xA) < 1
3− 8c(k)− 16tp + 16V + δ(1− k)
16tp
< 1
3− 8c(k)− 16tp + 16V + δ(1− k) < 16tp
3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k) < 32tp
tp >
1
32
(3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k))
The condition 0 < xA < xB < 1 is satisﬁed when 132(3−8c(k)+16V +δ(1−k)) <
tp < 1
16
(3− 8c(k) + 16V + δ(1− k))
4.7.5. Proof of developers multi-homing
When considering the possibility of developers multi-homing, the indirect utility of
a developer z who works with platform A or platform B or both platforms is given
by
U(z) =

β − tczA − lA + uAv if joining A
β − tc(1− zB)− lB + uBv if joining B
2β + v − pA − pB − tc if joining both platforms
A developer who is indiﬀerent between working with platform A or working with
both platforms is given byU(z)A = U(z)A+U(z)B, speciﬁcally we have that β−tczA−
lA+ x̂v = 2β + v− lA− lB − tc. We solve for zA, and we obtain zA = lB+tc+v(x̂−1)−βtc .
A developer who is indiﬀerent between working with platform B or working with
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both platforms is given by U(z)B = U(z)A + U(z)B, speciﬁcally we have that β −
tc(1− zB)− lB + (1− x̂)v = 2β + v − lA − lB − tc. We solve for zB, and we obtain
zB =
vx̂+β−lA
tc
.
The indiﬀerent consumer between A and B is given by UA = UB,
V − tpx− pA + zBλ = V − tp(1− x)− pB + (1− zA)λ. We solve for x̂ and obtain
the indiﬀerent consumer x̂ = pB−pA+t
p+λ(zA+zB−1)
2tp
. As we know the values of zA and
zB, substituting these values into the equation we have
x̂ =
pB − pA + tp + λ(( lB+t
c+v(x̂−1)−β
tc
) + ( vx̂+β−lA
tc
)− 1)
2tp
We solve for x̂ and we have the indiﬀerent consumer as a function of prices and
license fees x̂ = t
c(tp+pB−pA)−λ(lA−lB+v)
2(tctp−λv) .
We can solve the indiﬀerent type of developers by substituting the value of x̂ to
obtain
zA =
lB + t
c + v(x̂− 1)− β
tc
=
lB + t
c + v( t
c(tp+pB−pA)−λ(lA−lB+v)
2(tctp−λv) − 1)− β
tc
=
=
2tc2tp − tcv(2λ+ tp + pA − pB) + lB(2tctp − λv)− 2tctpβ + λv(v + 2β − lA)
2tc(tctp − λv)
zB =
vx̂+ β − lA
tc
=
v( t
c(tp+pB−pA)−λ(lA−lB+v)
2(tctp−λv) ) + β − lA
tc
=
=
lA(λv − 2tctp) + λv(lB − v − 2β) + tcv(pB − pA + tp) + 2tptcβ
2tc(tctp − λv)
4.7.6. Proof of Assumption 3
To be consistent with consumers multi-homing we need 0 < zA < zb < 1. With the
ﬁnal values in equilibrium, the ordering becomes
0 <
8c(k)− 3 + 32tc − 16β − δ(1− k)
32tc
<
3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k)
32tc
< 1
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We focus ﬁrst on the left hand of the inequalities. Rearranging terms we obtain
0 < (zB − zA):
0 <
3− 8c(k)− 16tc + 16β + δ(1− k)
16tc
0 < 3− 8c(k)− 16tc + 16β + δ(1− k)
16tc < 3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k)
tc <
1
16
(3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k))
Now, we focus on the right hand side to obtain (zB − zA) < 1
3− 8c(k)− 16tc + 16β + δ(1− k)
16tc
< 1
3− 8c(k)− 16tp + 16β + δ(1− k) < 16tc
3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k) < 32tc
tc >
1
32
(3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k))
The condition 0 < zA < zB < 1 is satisfy when 132(3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k)) <
tc < 1
16
(3− 8c(k) + 16β + δ(1− k))
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4.7.7. Proof of Welfare
4.7.7.1. Consumers can be multi-homing
When consumers are multi-homing we have three segments of consumers and three
segments of surplus, the surplus from platform A users, the surplus from platform
B users, and the surplus from users that buy both platform, CS =
∫ xA
0
V − tpxA −
pA + nAλdxA +
∫ xB
xA
2V + λ− pA − pB − tpdx
∫ 1
xB
V − tp(1− xB)− pB + nBλdxB.
Developers surplus is
DS =
∫ ẑ
0
β − tcẑ − lA + uAvdz +
∫ 1
ẑ
β − tc(1− ẑ)− lB + uBvdz.
4.7.7.2. Single-homing
First of all we compute the consumer surplus
CS =
∫ x̂
0
(V − tpx̂− pA + nAλ)dx+
∫ 1
x̂
(V − tp(1− x̂)− pB + nBλ)dx =
V − pAx̂+ (x̂− 1)(pB − tpx̂) + λ(1− ẑ + x̂(2ẑ − 1))− tp2 . Developers surplus is
DS =
∫ ẑ
0
(β − tcẑ − lA + uAv)dz +
∫ 1
ẑ
(β − tc(1− ẑ)− lB + uBv)dz =
β + v(1− x) + lB(ẑ − 1)− lAẑ + vẑ(2x− 1) + tc(ẑ − ẑ2 − 12).
4.7.7.3. Developers can be multi-homing
Consumer surplus CS =
∫ x̂
0
V − tpx̂− pA+ nAλdx+
∫ 1
x̂
V − tp(1− x̂)− pB + nBλdx
and developer surplus DS =∫ zA
0
β−tczA−lA+uAvdzA+
∫ zB
zA
2β+v−lA−lb−tcdz+
∫ 1
zB
β−tc(1−zb)−lb+uBvdzB.
4.7.8. Proof of Comparisons social optimum
4.7.8.1. Comparisons consumers multi-homing case
Now, we compare the results with consumers multi-homing.
The equilibrium price is p∗CM =
1
32
(1+16V −8v+3δ(1−k)), the socially optimal
price is p˜∗CM =
1
8
(1 − 2v + 4V ), the diﬀerence is given by p∗CM − p˜∗CM = − 332(1 +
δ(k − 1)).
The license fees are diﬀerent, in the market equilibrium we have l∗CM = t
c −
(3δ(1−k)+1)(1+24v+16V+3δ(1−k))
256tp
and in the social optimum l˜∗CM =
1
8
(2v − 1). It turns
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out that l∗ − l˜∗ = 3(1−δ(1−k))(5+24v+16V+3δ(1−k))
256tp
.
Platforms proﬁt in the market equilibrium is
pi∗CM =
1
2
tc − 48v(3δ(1− k) + 1) + (1 + 3δ(1− k))
2 + 64v2 − 256V 2
1024tp
and in the social optimum pi∗CM =
32tctp−4v(3+v)+16V 2−1
64tc
, the diﬀerence between
them is
pi∗CM − pi∗CM = 3(5 + 48v + 3δ(1− k))(1− δ(1− k))
1024tp
Total welfare in the market equilibrium is
W ∗CM =
3(1 + 8v + 16V + 3δ(1− k))2 − 256tp(4c(k) + tc + δ(1− k)− 1)
1024tp
and in the social optimum is W˜ ∗CM =
3(1+2v+4V )2−16tctp
64tp
, the diﬀerence
W ∗CM − W˜ ∗CM = − ((9(1− δ(1− k)δ)(5 + 16v + 32V + 3δ(1− k)) + 256tp(4c(k) + δ(1− k)− 1)
1024tp
4.7.8.2. Comparisons single-homing case
Now, we compare the results with single-homing.
The equilibrium price and the socially optimal price are the same.
The license fees are diﬀerent, in the former case we have l∗SH = t
c− 3
8
δ(1− k)− 1
8
and in the social optimum l˜∗SH = t
c− 1
2
. We can easily subtraction one from another
to obtain l∗SH − l˜∗SH = 38(1 + δ(k − 1)) .
Platforms proﬁt is pi∗ = 1
2
(tc + tp) − 1
2
λ − 1
2
v and in the social optimum is
pi∗ = 1
4
(2(tc+tp−v)−1), the diﬀerence between them is pi∗SH−pi∗SH = 316(1+δ(k−1)).
Total welfare isW ∗SH =
1
16
(5−4(tc+tp)+12v−δ(1−k)) and in the social optimum
W˜ ∗SH =
1
4
(1− tc − tp + 2v) + V , the diﬀerence isW ∗SH − W˜ ∗SH = 116(1 + δ(k− 1)). As
we can observe the license fee, platform proﬁt and total welfare with single-homing
is always higher in the market equilibrium.
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4.7.8.3. Comparisons developers multi-homing case
Now, we compare the results with developers multi-homing.
The equilibrium price is p∗DM = t
p − v(7+8v+5δ(1−k)−16c(k))
32tc
, the socially optimal
price is p˜∗DM =
8tctp−v(3+2v)
8tc
, the diﬀerence is p∗DM − p˜∗DM = − 332(1 + δ(k − 1)).
The license fees are diﬀerent, in the market equilibrium we have l∗DM =
1
32
(3+8v−
7δ(1− k)− 16c(k)) and in the social optimum l˜∗DM = 18(2v − 1) we can subtraction
one from another to obtain l∗DM − l˜∗DM = 3(1−δ(1−k))(5+24v+16V+3δ(1−k))256tp .
Platform proﬁt in the market equilibrium is
pi∗DM =
512tctp + 15 + 128c(k)(2c(k)− 1)− 16v(3 + 4v) + δ(k − 1)(38− 128c(k) + 144v + 7δ(k − 1))
1024tc
and in the social optimum pi∗DM =
32tctp−4v(3+v)+16V 2−1
64tc
, the diﬀerence between
them is
pi∗DM − pi∗DM = (256c(k)
2 − 128c(k)(1 + δ(−1 + k)) + (1 + δ(−1 + k))(31 + 144v − 7δ(1− k))
1024tc
Total welfare in the market equilibrium is
W
∗
DM =
85 + 1280c(k)2 + 2048tctp − 16v(7 + 12v) − 2δ(1 − k)(81 + 296v) + 29δ2(1 − k)2 − 32c(k)(21 + 8v − 17δ(1 − k))
1024tc
and in the social optimum W˜ ∗DM =
128tctp−4v(11+3v)−3
64tc
, the diﬀerence is given by
W ∗DM − W˜ ∗DM =
1280c(k)2 − 32c(k)(21 + 8v − 17δ(1− k)) + (1− δ(1− k))(133 + 592v − 29δ(1− k))
1024tc
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